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Abstract
In this study, we investigate the international coordination of debt rules
in an economy consisting of a large number of countries with varying degrees
of present bias. A case whereby each country sets its own uncoordinated
debt rules is compared with a case whereby all countries have common
coordinated debt rules. Countries with weak present-biased preferences in-
crease their debt issuance and suffer from welfare losses by participating in
coordination. In contrast, countries with strong present-biased preferences
reduce their debt issuance and can enjoy welfare improvement by partici-
pating in coordination. The contrasting results suggest the possibility that
the former have little incentive to follow the coordinated rule.
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1 Introduction
Since the European debt crisis of late 2009, there has been increasing attention to
the sustainability of public debt in developed countries (Collignon, 2012; Beqiraj,
Fedeli, Forte, 2018). In today’s highly integrated world economy, a fiscal crisis in
one country could have a ripple effect on other countries. For example, the Greek
debt crisis impacted other sovereign bond prices and reduced the financial value of
European firms (Bhanot et al., 2014). In the wake of the financial and economic
crisis, the EU has placed even greater emphasis on maintaining fiscal discipline
in the region and has strictly enforced common fiscal rules to be followed by EU
member states (Banerji et al., 2015).
Having a common set of fiscal rules for several countries, such as the EU,
is more enforceable in terms of adherence to the rules than if each country has
its own fiscal rules. For example, the EU invokes the excessive deficit procedure
(EDP) for countries that significantly deviate from the common fiscal rules of the
member states, placing the country’s finances under EU supervision and in some
cases imposing fines (Lledo et al., 2017). The presence of such external sanctions
increases the incentive for countries to comply with the rules and makes the fiscal
rules more effective.
However, common fiscal rules are not always followed. The financial crisis of
early 2010, for example, was caused by the incoming Greek government’s reve-
lation that the budget deficit reported in 2009 was underestimated (Higgins and
Klitgaard, 2011). This suggests that Greece may not have followed the EU’s rule
of keeping the budget deficit within 3 percent of GDP. Italy was also pointed out
by the EU in 2019 for its failure to comply with the rule mentioned above (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2019).1 Although the EDP was not triggered in either case,
these cases illustrate the difficulty in getting all the member countries to comply
with the common rules.
In this background, this study addresses three fundamental questions: 1.
Which common fiscal rule is optimal under the possibility of violation of the rule?
2. Which countries would benefit (or lose) from the introduction of a common
fiscal rule? 3. Would a common fiscal rule improve fiscal discipline in all partic-
ipating countries? To answer these questions, this study provides a theoretical
analysis using a political economy model. For the common fiscal rule, this study
focuses on the ceiling on government debt.
1According to EEAG (2011), such rule violations are not uncommon and occur frequently in
EU member countries.
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In considering the role of debt rules, this study focuses on time-inconsistent
decision-making arising from households’ present-biased preferences. If house-
holds’ preferences have a present bias, they have an incentive to consume more
in the present compared to their previous consumption plans, which they previ-
ously considered optimal (Strotz, 1956; Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997).
In addition, present-biased preferences also affect the formation of fiscal policies.
Households can increase current consumption and decrease future consumption by
voting to support the issuance of public bonds and tax cuts. Such voting behavior
suggests the need for a rule imposing a cap on public bond issuance.
Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015) focus on the impact of households’ present-
biased preferences on fiscal policy formation. In their three-period model, house-
holds gain consumption in the second and third periods by using the resources
they hold in the first period to purchase liquid and illiquid assets. Households in
period 2 (hereafter, period-2 selves) with present-biased preferences will have in-
centives to consume more in the second period and less in the third period. Such a
change in plans is undesirable for period-1 households (hereafter, period-1 selves).
Therefore, period-1 selves attempt to prevent overconsumption by period-2 selves
through the purchase of illiquid assets. However, period-2 selves can increase their
consumption in the second period by cutting taxes and issuing bonds through
voting fiscal policy choices. If period-1 selves do not have sufficient control over
period-2 selves’ government bond issuance through asset selection, then the ceiling
on government bond issuance becomes effective.
Arawatari and Ono (2020a) extend the model of Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv
(2015) by assuming that households can determine the government debt ceiling
in the first period through a vote and that they can choose debt issuance above
the ceiling by paying additional costs. These settings allow us to investigate why
fiscal rule violations, reported in Wyplosz (2013), occur frequently. We extend
the model further to an economy consisting of a large number of countries with
varying degrees of present bias. This extension allows us to consider the formation
of a common debt rule among countries (henceforth, a coordinated debt rule),
which aims to maximize the weighted sum of utility functions of all countries. In
particular, this study focuses on the mandatory case in which all countries are
forced to form a coalition, regardless of whether they benefit or lose from the
coordinated debt rule. The extension also enables us to compare the coordinate
rule to an uncoordinated debt rule that aims to maximize each country’s welfare.
The goal of our analysis is to measure the changes in government bond issuance
and welfare of each country when moving from an uncoordinated rule case to a
2
coordinated rule case.
The results of this study are threefold. First, we compare the government debt
ceiling set by period-1 selves in the case of the uncoordinated rule with that of the
coordinated rule. Whether a case achieves a stricter ceiling on government bond
issuance depends on the degree of present bias in each country (Propositions 2
and 3). In the uncoordinated rule case, each country sets an optimal debt ceiling
according to the level of its present bias. If the ceiling on government bond
issuance is set at a low level, period-2 selves will have an incentive to vote for
government bond issuance over the ceiling. To avoid such rule-breaking, period-1
selves set the ceiling high enough to ensure that period-2 selves do not break the
rule. Meanwhile, under the coordinated rule, all countries are subject to the same
ceiling on government bond issuance. Thus, the ceiling in the coordination rule
case is tighter for countries with a strong present bias and, conversely, looser for
countries with a weak present bias.
Second, we compare the volume of government bond issuance under the un-
coordinated rule with that under the coordinated rule. Whether a case achieves
a higher bond issuance depends on the degree of present bias (Proposition 4).
As noted above, for countries with strong present-biased preferences, the debt
ceiling is tighter under the coordinated rule than under the uncoordinated rule.
This means that countries with strong present-biased preferences will reduce their
bond issuance by participating in the coordinated rule. However, for countries
with weak present-biased preferences, the ceiling on government bond issuance is
looser under the coordinated rule than under the coordinated rule. Thus, coun-
tries with weak present-biased preferences will increase their bond issuance by
participating in the coordinated rule.
Finally, whether countries achieve improvements in social welfare by partic-
ipating in the coordinated rule depends on the following three effects: 1. The
unifying effect, which requires all countries to have the same debt ceiling. This
causes welfare losses as it leads to deviations from the optimal debt ceiling for
each country. 2. The penalty effect of deviating from the coordinated rule. This
penalty weakens the incentive for each country to deviate from the coordinated
rule, reduces the volume of government bond issuance, and improves welfare. 3.
The distortionary effect, where countries with a high degree of present bias, even
with the penalties described above, choose to deviate from the coordinated rule
and issue bonds over the ceiling. The costs associated with this will result in wel-
fare losses. The functioning of any of these three effects depends on the degree of
present bias. In countries with weak present-biased preferences, participation in
3
the coordinated rule will lead to a deterioration in social welfare as a result of the
unifying effect. By contrast, in countries with strong present-biased preferences,
the net effect of participating in the coordination on social welfare depends on
the degree of present bias as well as other structural parameters, as the remaining
two effects, in addition to the unifying effect, also operate (Proposition 5).
The first and second results lead to the consequence that the introduction of
the coordinated rule works to reduce the volume of bond issuance in countries
with strongly present-biased preferences and excessive debt . In other words, the
coordinated rule is more effective than the uncoordinated rule in achieving the ob-
jective of curbing the excessive issuance of public debt and restoring fiscal health.
However, if participation in the coordinated debt rule is optional rather than
mandatory for each country, then, as the third result suggests, whether countries
are willing to adopt the coordinated rule depends on the relative size of the three
effects mentioned above. In particular, when the unifying and distortionary effects
dominate the penalty effect, countries with strongly present-biased preferences and
excessive debt will refuse to adopt the coordinated rule. This implies the difficulty
of introducing and maintaining the coordinated rule that contributes to the fiscal
health of regional economies such as the EU . Therefore, to get countries to com-
mit to the coordinated rule, it will be necessary to implement measures such as
the acceptance of standard violations in times of economic downturn or broader
cooperation among countries on fiscal issues.
This study is related to the literature on the political economy of fiscal rules
(Arawatari and Ono, 2020a; Coate and Milton, 2019; Dovis and Kirpalani, 2020;
Halac and Yared, 2018). All of which (except Halac and Yared, 2018) analyze the
formation of fiscal policy in the case of possible violations of fiscal rules. As their
analyses focus on a single domestic fiscal rule, they do not address the international
coordination of fiscal rules. In contrast, Halac and Yared (2018) present an open
economy model in which they compare two sets of rules: coordinated rules chosen
jointly by a group of countries and uncoordinated rules chosen independently by
each country. However, they do not provide for potential violations of fiscal rules.
They show that the coordinated rules are slacker when the present bias is large
because of a disciplining effect through the interest rate. This study abstracts
away such an effect through the interest rate but unlike Halac and Yared 2018,
provides for the possibility of rule violation in each country, as in Coate and Milton
(2019) and Dovis and Kirpalani (2020). We show that this possibility shapes rule
formation critically, and the resulting fiscal discipline is tighter in the coordinated
case than in the uncoordinated case. Our results are in contrast to those shown
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in Halac and Yared (2018).
This study is also related to the literature on the international political econ-
omy of public debt. This literature can be divided into two categories: the study
of small open economies (e.g., Persson and Svensson, 1989; Song, Storesletten,
and Zilibotti, 2012; Arawatari and Ono, 2017, 2020b) and the study of large open
economies (e.g., Chang, 1990; Arcalean, 2017, 2018; Janeba and Todtenhauput,
2018). This study is in line with the first category in that the policy of each
country is assumed to have no direct impact on the world interest rate. This
study is also in line with the second category in that we compare debt and welfare
associated with uncoordinated and coordinated fiscal policies and examine under
which conditions welfare is improved by international policy coordination. None
of the above-mentioned studies address the international coordination of fiscal
rules, whereas this study focuses on its role.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 characterizes an equilibrium allocation for a given debt rule.
Section 4 considers the endogenous determination of debt rules via voting. In
particular, we examine two types of rules, the uncoordinated rule and the coor-
dinated rule, and compare them in terms of debt levels and welfare. Section 5
provides concluding remarks. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The model is based on the one developed by Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015).
It measures identical agents who live for three periods, 1, 2, and 3. They are
endowed with k units of goods in period 1 and nothing in periods 2 and 3. In
period 1, agents only make savings and portfolio decisions; they receive utility
from consumption in periods 2 and 3.
Agents (hereafter interchangeably called individuals, selves, and voters) have
time-inconsistent, present biased preferences (Stortz, 1965; Phelps and Pollak,
1968; Laibson, 1997). In particular, agents’ preferences over consumption in pe-
riod 2 and 3, c2 and c3, are given by the following utility functions:
U1(c2, c3) = β [u (c2) + u (c3)] ,
U2 (c2, c3) = u (c2) + βu (c3) ,
where Ut (t = 1, 2) is the assessed utility at time t, u is a continuous and strictly
concave utility function, and β ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter representing the degree of
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present bias; a lower β implies that period-2 selves are biased toward more period-
2 consumption. Agents are assumed to be sophisticated; they are fully aware of
their self-control problems.
Agents choose to invest their wealth, k, in liquid or illiquid assets in period 1.
It is assumed that all liquid and illiquid assets have the same exogenous interest
rate of zero. Liquid assets are one-period securities that are sold in period t
(t = 1, 2) and redeemed in period t + 1. Illiquid assets are two-period securities
that are sold in period 1 and redeemed in period 3; they cannot be sold in period
2. Savings in one- and two-period securities in period 1 are denoted by s12 and
s13, respectively; the subscript ij is the time of saving, i, and redemption, j. In
period 2, agents can save the return from s12 in one-period securities; this saving
is denoted by s23.
Agents displaying present-biased preferences suffer from self-control problems.
In particular, period-2 selves are tempted to increase consumption in period 2 at
the cost of reduced consumption in period 3. Period-1 selves use illiquid assets to
constrain the consumption plans of their future selves. However, the government,
representing period-2 selves, is induced to issue public debt in the international
market to respond to period-2 selves’ desire to undo the commitment made in
period 1. This gives sophisticated agents an incentive to rebalance their portfolios
in period 1 to reestablish their consumption sequence commitment. This, in turn,
creates a demand for further debt accumulation. The debt issue, denoted by d, is
assumed to be costly and constrained by the constitutionally imposed debt ceiling,
denoted by d̄, but debt issues beyond the ceiling are available by incurring some
additional costs, as specified below:
The budget constraints in periods 1, 2, and 3 are given by
period 1: s12 + s13 ≤ k,
period 2: c2 ≤ s12 + d− s23,
period 3: c3 ≤ s13 + s23 −G(d),
where G(d) represents the costs of debt repayment, specified as follows:
G(d) =
{
(1 + η)d when d ≤ d̄,
(1 + η)d+ (γ + ω)(d− d̄) when d > d̄,
where η > 0, γ > 0, and ω ≥ 0.
Debt is financed by foreign lenders at an interest rate of zero but can be directly
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distortionary. The term η represents the marginal cost of debt issuance, such as
labor supply distortions induced by increased tax burdens for debt repayments
(Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv, 2015). The term γ, introduced in this study, represents
the marginal costs of issuing public debt, conditional on the level of debt being
above d̄. Such costs could be viewed as reputational losses for rule-breaking coun-
ties (Eyraud et al., 2018). The term ω presents the penalties for rule violation
when a country violates an internationally accepted debt ceiling (Yared, 2019).
For example, in the EU, an excessive deficit procedure applies whenever a fiscal
limit is breached. The procedure is costly and imposes potential sanctions (Lledo
et al., 2017). Thus, the marginal cost of debt issuance beyond the ceiling, d̄, is γ
when each country sets the ceiling independently, and it is γ + ω when countries
agree on and share a common ceiling. We assume that the costs of debt issuance
and rule-breaking, expressed in η and γ, respectively, are bounded, and we also
assume that the penalties, expressed in ω, are capped as in Dovis and Kirpalani
(2020) and Halac and Yared (2020). Otherwise, regardless of the choice of the
debt ceiling, an efficient allocation, defined below, will always be achieved.
The timing of events and the optimization problem at each stage are as follows:
In period 1, an agent who predicts an equilibrium per capita public debt level of
d, chooses period-1 savings intended for period 2, s12, and for period 3, s13, to
maximize the assessed utility in period 1, U1. As the debt level is determined by
the government representing period-2 selves, each agent takes it as given when
making his/her saving decision. The problem of period-1 selves is
max
s12,s13
β [u (s12 + d
e − s23 (s12)) + u (s13 + s23 (s12)−G(d
e))]
s.t. s12 + s13 ≤ k,
s12 ≥ 0, s13 ≥ 0,
given de,
where de denotes the expected level of debt issue in period 2, which is taken as
given. The term s23(s12) implies that agents know that their choice of s12 (and
thus s13) will have an effect on period-2 saving choice, s23. Private borrowing is
not allowed, following Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015).
In period 2, an agent chooses the savings intended for period 3, s23, taking d
e
as given, to maximize the assessed utility in period 2. The problem of period-2
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selves is
max
s23
u (s12 + d
e − s23) + βu (s13 + s23 −G(d
e))
s.t. s23 ≥ 0,
given s12, s13, and d
e.
The government, representing period-2 selves, chooses public debt issue, d,
to maximize the utility of period2 selves, subject to a non-negativitiy constraint,
d ≥ 0, and a constitutionally imposed debt ceiling, d̄, given s12, s13, and s23.
2
max
d
u (s12 + d− s23) + βu (s13 + s23 −G(d))
s.t. d ≥ 0,
given s12, s13, and s23.
Figure 1 illustrates the timing of events.
[Figure 1 is here.]
For our analysis, we make the following assumptions. First, the utility function
is specified as
u (c) = ln c.
This assumption enables us to solve the model analytically. Second, the borrow-
ing must be below the natural debt limit, k/η, to prevent the government from
defaulting. Third, to define the debt ceiling, it is assumed that the ceiling is below
the natural debt limit, as in the following assumption.3
Assumption 1. d̄ < k/η.
We characterize the first-best allocation as a benchmark. The first-best alloca-
tion, denoted by
(
cf2 , c
f
3
)
is the optimal consumption sequence with commitment
in period 1. Namely,
(
cf2 , c
f
3
)
maximizes ln c2 + ln c3 subject to the resource con-
straint, c2+c3 ≤ k. Thus, it is optimal for the period-1 selves to allocate resources
evenly between the two periods,
(
cf2 , c
f
3
)
= (k/2, k/2). We note that the debt is-
sue, d > 0, leads to an inefficient allocation of resources because it reduces the
available resource for consumption. In other words, d = 0 is necessary for an
allocation to be efficient.
2Lending in the international market, d < 0, is abstracted away from the analysis because
our focus is on borrowing, d > 0. Allowing for d < 0 does not qualitatively alter the following
result.
3This assumption works when we solve the period-1 agents’ optimization problem.
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3 Fiscal Policy Making
As mentioned above, agents are assumed to be sophisticated. Thus, we solve
the model through backward induction; that is, we first solve the government’s
problem in period 2, the agents’ problem in period 2, and finally, the agents’
problem in period 1. Our results would not change if the timing within period
2 is reversed because the period-2 selves and the government share a common
objective.
3.1 Government’s Decision in Period 2
The objective of the government, representing the period-2 selves, is
Vg (s12, s23, d) ≡ ln (s12 + d− s23) + β ln [k − s12 + s23 −G(d)] .
Assuming interior solutions, we can write down the first-order conditions with
respect to d when d ≤ d̄ and d > d̄, as follows:
∂Vg (s12, s23, d)
∂d
∣
∣
∣
∣
d≤d̄
= (s12 + d− s23)
−1 − β (1 + η) · [k − s12 + s23 − (1 + η)d]
−1 ,
(1)
∂Vg (s12, s23, d)
∂d
∣
∣
∣
∣
d>d̄
= (s12 + d− s23)
−1
− β (1 + η + γ + ω) ·
[
k − s12 + s23 − (1 + η + γ + ω)d+ (γ + ω)d̄
]−1
.
(2)
Let du and dc denote interior solutions satisfying the first-order conditions in
Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively. The subscripts “u” and “c” mean that the choice of
d is “unconstrained” and “constrained” by the debt rule, respectively. When the
choice is constrained, the government can break the rule by incurring additional
costs. The solutions are expressed as functions of s12 and s23 as follows:
du (s12, s23) =
k − [1 + β (1 + η)] (s12 − s23)
(1 + β) (1 + η)
, (3)
dc (s12, s23) =
k + (γ + ω)d̄− [1 + β (1 + η + γ + ω)] (s12 − s23)
(1 + β) (1 + η + γ + ω)
, (4)
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where du (s12, s23) and d
c (s12, s23) satisfy
dc (s12, s23) ⋛ d̄ ⇔ A (s12, s23) ≡
k − [1 + β (1 + η + γ + ω)] (s12 − s23)
1 + η + β (1 + η + γ + ω)
⋛ d̄,
and4
A (s12, s23) ≤ d
u (s12, s23) .
The condition of A (s12, s23) ≤ d
u (s12, s23) implies that there are four pos-
sible cases, classified according to the relative magnitude among du (s12, s23),
A (s12, s23), and d̄, as illustrated in Figure 2: d
u (s12, s23) ≤ 0 ≤ d̄ (panel (a)),
0 < du (s12, s23) < d̄ (panel (b)), A (s12, s23) ≤ d̄ ≤ d
u (s12, s23) (panel (c)), and
d̄ < A (s12, s23) (panel (d)). From the figure, we find that the solution d for the
government problem, denoted by d∗ (s12, s23), as follows:
d∗ (s12, s23) =











0 when du (s12, s23) ≤ 0,
du (s12, s23) when 0 < d
u (s12, s23) < d̄,
d̄ when A (s12, s23) ≤ d̄ ≤ d
u (s12, s23) ,
dc (s12, s23) when d̄ < A (s12, s23) .
(5)
[Figure 2.]
Consider du (s12, s23), which represents the optimal level of public debt when it
satisfies the debt ceiling. Eq. (3) indicates that du (s12, s23) increases as (s12−s23)
and β decrease. The term (s12−s23), representing the period-2 consumption when
there is no debt issue, implies that the marginal utility of period-2 consumption
increases as (s12 − s23) decreases. The term β, representing the present bias,
implies that the period-2 selves attach a larger weight on the period-2 consumption
relative to the period-3 consumption as β decreases. Thus, the period-2 selves’
preferences for debt financing increase as (s12 − s23) and β decrease.
More precisely, suppose that (s12−s23) and β are high, such that d
u (s12, s23) ≤
0 holds. Then, the optimal level of public debt is below zero. In other words,
the government prefers to lend rather than borrow in the international market.
However, lending is not allowed in the present framework. Thus, the government’s
choice is constrained by the non-negativity constraint; the optimal level of public
debt becomes d∗ = 0, as illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 2. When (s12− s23) and
4Proof of A (s12, s23) ≤ d
u (s12, s23) is as follows: Suppose, contrastingly, that A (s12, s23) >
du (s12, s23), that is, 0 > k/η + s12 − s23 holds. The period-2 budget constraint leads to c2 ≤
s12 + d − s23 < s12 + k/η − s23, where the second inequality comes from d ≤ d̄ < k/η. Given
c2 > 0, this implies that 0 < s12 + k/η − s23, which is a contradiction.
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β are at moderate levels, such that 0 < du (s12, s23) < d̄, the government is not
constrained by the non-negativity constraint or the debt ceiling. Thus, its choice
is d∗ = du (s12, s23), as illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 1.
Finally, when (s12 − s23) and β are low, such that d̄ ≤ d
u (s12, s23) holds,
the government may borrow over the debt ceiling. In particular, its decision
depends on the relative magnitude between A (s12, s23) and d̄. Since A (s12, s23) is
decreasing in (γ+ω), which represents the costs of rule-breaking, the government
finds it is optimal to follow the rule and issues debt up to the limit, d∗ = d̄, when
(γ + ω) is large, such that A (s12, s23) ≤ d̄, as illustrated in panel (c) of Figure 2.
However, rule-breaking occurs when (γ + ω) is low, such that d̄ < A (s12, s23), as
illustrated in panel (d) of Figure 2.
3.2 Period-2 Selves’ Decision
Next, we consider the period-2 selves’ decision regarding one-period securities,
s23. The objective function of the period-2 selves is
V2 (s12, s23, d
e) ≡ ln (s12 + d
e − s23) + β ln [k − s12 + s23 −G (d
e)] .
It should be noted that period-2 selves take de as given when choosing s23 because
they are infinitesimal and thus are unable to control d by choosing s23. The first-
order condition, with respect to s23, leads to
s23 = s
u
23 (s12, d
e) ≡ s12 −
k − (1 + η + β) de
1 + β
when de ≤ d̄, (6)
s23 = s
c
23 (s12, d
e) ≡ s12 −
k + (γ + ω)d̄− (1 + η + γ + ω + β) de
1 + β
when de > d̄.
(7)
With the private borrowing constraint, s23 ≥ 0, and the expectation of d = d
e,
an optimal level of s23, denoted by s
∗
23, is given by
s∗23(s12, d
e) =











0 when de ≤ d̄ and s12 ≤ S
u (de) ,
su23 (s12, d
e) when de ≤ d̄ and s12 > S
u (de) ,
0 when de > d̄ and s12 ≤ S
c (de) ,
sc23 (s12, d
e) when de > d̄ and s12 > S
c (de) ,
(8)
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where Su (de) and Sc (de), are defined as follows:
Su (de) ≡
k − (1 + η + β) de
1 + β
, (9)
Sc (de) ≡
k + (γ + ω)d̄− (1 + η + γ + ω + β) de
1 + β
. (10)
Period-2 selves attach larger weight to period-2 consumption than the period-1
selves. This implies that the former selves are induced to increase their period-2
consumption by lowering their saving in s23. In particular, the period-2 selves find
it optimal to save nothing in s23 when the expectation of d
e is low and/or when
the savings in one-period securities, s12, by the period-1 selves is low, such that
either s12 ≤ S
u (de) or s12 ≤ S
c (de) holds. If this were not the case, the period-2
selves could afford to save a portion of the return from one-period securities, s12,
in s23.
3.3 Period-1 Selves’ Decision
Consider the period-1 agent’s objective function, which is given by
V1 (s12, d
e) ≡ ln [s12 + d
e − s∗23(s12, d
e)] + ln [k − s12 + s
∗
23(s12, d
e)−G (de)] .
It is assumed that period-1 and period-2 selves have the same expectation for
d. Given the expectation of d = de, the period-1 agent chooses s12 to maximize
his/her objective. Let s∗12 denote the solution to the problem. The solution
satisfies the following first-order condition:
∂V1 (s12, d
e)
∂s12
=
[
1−
∂s∗23(s12, d
e)
∂s12
]
· [s12 + d
e − s∗23(s12, d
e)]−1
−
[
1−
∂s∗23(s12, d
e)
∂s12
]
· [k − s12 + s
∗
23(s12, d
e)−G (de)]−1 ≤ 0,(11)
where a strict inequality holds if s12 = 0.
3.4 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Having described the behavior of agents and the government, we define the ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium in the framework as follows.
Definition 1: Given a debt rule d̄, a rational expectations equilibrium is an al-
location (s12, s13, s23, c2, c3, d), such that (i) s12 = s
∗
12(d
e) solves the period-
12
1 agent’s problem given s23 and d = d
e; (ii) s23 = s
∗
23(s
∗
12(d
e), de) solves
period-2 agent’s problem given s12 and d = d
e; (iii) rational expectations
hold, that is, the solution to the period-2 government’s problem, d, satis-
fies d∗
(
s∗12(d
e), s∗23(s
∗
12(d
e), de)
)
= de; and (iv) given s12 = s
∗
12(d
e), s23 =
s∗23(s
∗
12(d
e), de), and d = d∗
(
s∗12(d
e), s∗23(s
∗
12(d
e), de)
)
, allocation (s13, c2, c3)
is determined by the period-1, -2, and -3 budget constraints.
[Figure 3 is here].
To characterize the equilibrium allocation, we proceed with the analysis as
follows. First, we assume that period-1 and period-2 selves have one of the fol-
lowing expectations of d: (i) de = 0, (ii) de = du ∈
(
0, d̄
)
, (iii) de = d̄, and
(iv) de = dc(> d̄), where du and dc denote the expectations of agents that the
debt issuance is below or above the ceiling, d̄, respectively. Given the expecta-
tion of the debt issuance, we solve for one-period securities, s12 = s
∗
12(d
e) and
s23 = s
∗
23(s
∗
12(d
e), de). Then we substitute these into the solution d = d∗ (s12, s23)
for the government problem, and identify the condition in which the expectations
are rational.
Let d̄L(β) and d̄H(β)(> d̄L(β)) denote two threshold values of the public debt:
d̄L(β) ≡
k
1 + η + β(1 + η + γ + ω)
, (12)
d̄H(β) ≡
k
1 + η + β(1 + η)
. (13)
With the use of these two threshold values, we can present the equilibrium level
of public debt, denoted by d∗, in the following proposition. The corresponding
allocation of savings and consumption is presented in the Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1. (Equilibrium Public Debt for a Given Debt Rule)
(i) There exists an equilibrium in which the equilibrium debt is beyond the ceil-
ing, d∗ > d̄, if β ≤ 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) and d̄ < d̄L(β).
(ii) There exists a continuum of equilibria in which the equilibrium debt is beyond
the ceiling, d∗ ∈ (d̄, (k+(γ+ω)d̄)/(2+ η+ γ+ω)), if β = 1/(1+ η+ γ+ω)
and d̄ < k/(2 + η).
(iii) There exists an equilibrium in which the equilibrium debt is up to the ceiling,
d∗ = d̄, if (a) max{k/(2+η), d̄L(β)} ≤ d̄ ≤ d̄H(β), or (b) 1/(1+η+γ+ω) ≤
β ≤ 1/(1 + η) and d̄ < k/(2 + η).
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(iv) There exists an equilibrium in which the equilibrium debt is positive and
below the ceiling, 0 < d∗ < d̄, if β ≤ 1/(1 + η) and d̄H(β) < d̄.
(v) There exists a continuum of equilibria in which the equilibrium debt is posi-
tive and below the ceiling, d∗ ∈ (0,min{k/(2 + η), d̄}), if β = 1/(1 + η) and
d̄ > 0.
(vi) There exists an equilibrium in which the equilibrium debt is zero, d∗ = 0, if
β ≥ 1/(1 + η).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
[Figure 4 is here].
Figure 4 takes β in the horizontal axis and d̄ in the vertical axis, and illustrates
the classification of equilibrium states according to the level of public debt. In the
area P.1(i), where β is below the threshold value, 1/(1+ η+ γ+ω), rule-breaking
occurs in equilibrium. The area P.1(i) widens as ω decreases. This implies that
the rule-breaking is more likely to occur in the uncoordinated case, ω = 0, than
in the coordinated case, ω > 0.
Figure 5 illustrates how the equilibrium levels of public debt, d∗, and one-
period securities from period 1 to period 2, s∗12, change in response to a change
in the degree of the present bias, represented by β. As observed in Figure 5,
a lower β is associated with a higher level of d∗ and a lower level of s∗12. A
lower β implies that period-2 selves are more present biased relative to period-1
selves. In other words, period-2 consumption, as planned by period-2 selves, is
excessive from the period-1 selves’ viewpoint. To establish control over period-2
consumption, period-1 selves reduce one-period securities, s∗12, which contribute
to period-2 consumption, and instead increase two-period securities, s∗13. Given
this behavior of period-1 selves, period-2 selves, as voters, support more public
debt issues to increase their consumption in period 2.
[Figure 5 here.]
From the figures, we see that the equilibrium level of public debt substantially
changes around the two threshold values of β, 1/(1 + η), and 1/(1 + η + γ + ω).
The mechanism behind these changes are as follows: First, consider the choice of
public debt around β = 1/(1 + η). When β is slightly higher than the threshold,
1/(1 + η), period-2 selves have little incentive to support public debt issues via
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voting. Period-1 selves can control period-2 selves’ decisions by saving decisions
in period 1 and attain the first-best allocation. However, when β is slightly lower
than the threshold, 1/(1 + η), period-1 selves are unable to prevent period-2
selves from issuing public debt. This limitation induces period-1 selves to cut
the savings on one-period securities, s∗12. To compensate for this loss of savings,
period-2 selves choose to considerably increase the public debt issue. This is the
mechanism behind the substantial changes in the amount of public debt around
the threshold β = 1/(1 + η).
Second, consider the choice of public debt around β = 1/(1 + η + γ + ω).
When β is slightly higher than the threshold, 1/(1 + η + γ + ω), period-2 selves
support and choose public debt issue up to the ceiling, d∗ = d̄, This implies that
for a β that is slightly lower than the threshold, 1/(1+ η+ γ+ω), period-2 selves
have an incentive to support the public debt issue beyond the ceiling at the cost of
rule-breaking. Given this expected behavior on the part of period-2 selves, period-
1 selves reduce the one-period securities, s∗12, to control the excess consumption
in period 2. Period-2 selves, in turn, choose to increase public debt issues to
compensate for the loss of the return from one-period securities. Therefore, there
is a substantial change in the amount of public debt around the threshold of
β = 1/(1 + η + γ + ω), when the ceiling d̄ is below k/(2 + η). However, such
change does not occur when the debt ceiling is high, such that d̄ > k/(2 + η)
holds. In this case, the equilibrium level of one-period securities, s∗12, is zero for
a β that is slightly higher than the threshold 1/(1 + η + γ + ω). Thus, period-1
selves are unable to reduce s∗12 further in response to a decrease in β.
4 Debt Rule Making
Thus far, we assume that the government takes the debt rule, represented by
d̄, as given. This assumption—which follows Bisin, Lizzeri and Yariv (2015)—is
reasonable in the short run, but in the long run, there must be a tendency toward
revising debt rules, as described in the Introduction. This section extends the
analysis in the previous sections by introducing endogenous determination of the
debt rule via voting.
We examine two types of rules, the uncoordinated rule (in Subsection 4.1) and
the coordinated rule (in Subsection 4.2), and compare them in terms of welfare,
focusing on the role of present bias in the formation of the rules (in Subsection
4.3). We assume that the debt rule is determined before the period-1 selves decide
on saving s12 and s13. Thus, the debt rule is set to maximize the indirect utility
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of period-1 selves.
4.1 Uncoordinated Debt Rules
We first consider the uncoordinated rule ω = 0. Under this rule, each country
independently sets the debt ceiling to maximize the welfare of its citizens. The
following proposition provides the optimal debt ceiling, the equilibrium level of
debt, and the associated welfare under the uncoordinated rule.
Proposition 2. In the uncoordinated rule case, the optimal debt ceiling for the
period-1 selves, d̄∗,uc, is
d̄∗,uc











= d̄L(β) if 0 ≤ β <
1
1+η+γ
,
=
{
k
2+η
, 0
}
if β = 1
1+η+γ
,
= 0 if 1
1+η+γ
< β ≤ 1
1+η
,
∈ [0, k/η] if 1
1+η
< β ≤ 1.
The equilibrium level of debt and the associated welfare level, d∗,uc(β), and W ∗,uc(β),
are
d∗,uc(β) =







d̄L(β) if 0 ≤ β <
1
1+η+γ
,
{
k
2+η
, 0
}
if β = 1
1+η+γ
,
0 if 1
1+η+γ
< β ≤ 1,
W ∗,uc(β) =







V ω=0(iii,a)
(
d̄L(β)
)
if 0 ≤ β < 1
1+η+γ
,
{
V ω=0(iii,a)
(
d̄L(β)
)
, 2 ln
(
k
2
)
}
if β = 1
1+η+γ
,
2 ln
(
k
2
)
if 1
1+η+γ
< β ≤ 1,
where
V ω=0(iii,a)
(
d̄L(β)
)
= ln
[
β(1 + η + γ)k2
{1 + η + β(1 + η + γ)}2
]
.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Figure 6 illustrates the results in Proposition 2, showing that the optimal
debt ceiling depends on the degree of present bias, β. When the present bias
is weak, to the extent such that 1/(1 + η) < β holds, period-1 selves can curb
period-2 selves’ excessive consumption and the corresponding debt issues only
through saving decisions on one- and two-period securities, s12 and s13. In other
16
words, debt ceilings are irrelevant for controlling period-2 selves’ behavior. Thus,
period-1 selves can attain the first-best allocation regardless of the levels of debt
ceilings.
[Figure 6 is here.]
When the present bias is strong, to the extent such that β ≤ 1/(1 + η) holds,
period-1 selves cannot curb period-2 selves’ behavior only through saving deci-
sions. Debt ceilings are relevant for controlling period-2 selves’ excessive con-
sumption and public debt issues. In particular, when β is within the range,
(1/(1 + η + γ), 1/(1 + η)], setting the debt ceiling at d̄∗ = 0 prevents period-2
selves from choosing excess consumption and public debt. Thus, period-1 selves
can attain the first-best allocation by managing savings, s12 and s13, and debt
ceilings, d̄.
However, when β is given, such that β < 1/(1 + η+ γ) holds, setting the debt
ceiling at d̄∗ = 0 induces period-2 selves to break the debt ceiling and thus creates
additional costs for period-1 selves. To avoid such cost increases, period-1 selves
need to set the debt ceiling at a maximum level such that period-2 selves never
break it. This implies that period-2 selves’ incentive for rule-breaking determines
the standard of the rule chosen by period-1 selves. Thus, when the degree of
present bias is strong, such that β < 1/(1+η+γ) holds, period-2 selves’ excessive
consumption is not fully controlled by period-1 selves’ decisions on saving and
debt ceilings; the first-best allocation is not implementable in this case.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that the implementation
of debt ceilings contribute to managing possible excessive consumption and the
associated overissue of public debt by period-2 selves only for the case with mod-
erate values of β ∈ (1/(1 + η + γ), 1/(1 + η)]. The effectiveness of debt ceilings is
limited for the case with low values of β, to an extent such that β < 1/(1+ η+ γ)
holds. In this case, the possibility of rule-breaking by period-2 selves shapes
period-1 selves’ decisions on debt ceilings and thus induces them to adopt lax,
rather than strict, rules.
4.2 Coordinated Debt Rules
In this section, we consider the case in which the debt rule is set in a coordinated
way. In particular, we assume that all countries form a fiscal union and coordinate
to set the debt ceiling that applies to members of the union. In other words,
participation in the setting of the coordinated debt rule is mandatory rather than
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optional for all member countries.5 In this situation, countries are expected to
have the following costs and benefits arising from their participation in the fiscal
union. First, the same debt ceiling is applied to every member country, but it
is generally too high or too low relative to each country’s optimal ceiling. This
gives the welfare losses associated with the deviation from each country’s optimal
debt ceiling. Second, the penalty (ω > 0), applied to countries that break the
coordinated debt rule, incentivizes them to control overissuance of public debt.
This generates welfare improvement for the member countries, especially for those
with a low value of β such that β < 1/(1 + η + γ) holds.
To evaluate such costs and benefits arising from the fiscal coordination, we
assume that countries form a fiscal union that aims to maximize a Benthamite
social welfare function that is a weighted sum of the utility functions of member
countries. For tractability of analysis, β is defined as a uniform distribution from
0 to 1. Under this assumption, the social welfare function, denoted by W u(d̄), is
given as follows:
WU(d̄) =











WUlow(d̄) when 0 ≤ d̄ <
k
2 + η
,
WUmid(d̄) when
k
2 + η
≤ d̄ <
k
1 + η
,
WU(d̄)high otherwise,
(14)
where W ulow(d̄), W
u
mid(d̄), and W
u
high(d̄) denotes the social welfare function when
d̄ is below k/(2 + η), between k/(2 + η) and k/(1 + η), and above k/(1 + η),
respectively. They are defined as:
WUlow(d̄) =
∫ 1
1+η+γ+ω
0
V ω>0(i) (d̄)dβ +
∫ 1
1+η
1
1+η+γ+ω
V ω>0(iii,b)(d̄)dβ +
∫ 1
1
1+η
V ω>0(vi) dβ, (15)
WUmid(d̄) =
∫ β1(d̄)
0
V ω>0(i) (d̄)dβ +
∫ β2(d̄)
β1(d̄)
V ω>0(iii,a)(d̄)dβ +
∫ 1
1+η
β2(d̄)
V ω>0(iv) dβ +
∫ 1
1
1+η
V ω>0(vi) dβ,
(16)
WUhigh =
∫ 1
1+η
0
V ω>0(iv) dβ +
∫ 1
1
1+η
V ω>0(vi) dβ, (17)
where V ω>0j
(
d̄
)
(j = (i), (iii, a), (iii, b), (iv), and (vi)) denote the indirect utility
5The optional case will be discussed later.
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associated with the statement j in Proposition 1 and is defined as follows:
V ω>0(i) (d̄) = 2 ln
[
k + (γ + ω)d̄
]
+ ln
[
β
(1 + β)2(1 + η + γ + ω)
]
, (18)
V ω>0(iii,a)(d̄) = ln
(
d̄
)
+ ln
[
k − (1 + η)d̄
]
, (19)
V ω>0(iii,b)(d̄) = 2 ln
(
k − ηd̄
2
)
, (20)
V ω>0(iv) = ln
[
βk2
(1 + β)2(1 + η)
]
, (21)
V ω>0(vi) = 2 ln
(
k
2
)
. (22)
Here, two remarks are in order. First, V ω>0(ii) and V
ω>0
(v) , representing the indirect
utility functions at β = 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) and β = 1/(1 + η), respectively,
are not included in the expression in (14). This is because the equilibrium at
β = 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) and β = 1/(1 + η) is a measure zero set. Second, the two
threshold values of β, β1(d̄) and β2
(
d̄
)
, as shown in Eq. (16) are defined as the
solutions to d̄ = d̄H(β) and d̄ = d̄L(β) for β, respectively. They are defined as
follows:
d̄ =
k
1 + η + β(1 + η + γ + ω)
⇔ β =
k − (1 + η)d̄
(1 + η + γ + ω)d̄
≡ β1(d̄), (23)
d̄ =
k
(1 + β)(1 + η)
⇔ β =
k − (1 + η)d̄
(1 + η)d̄
≡ β2(d̄). (24)
The following proposition provides the optimal debt ceiling set by the fiscal
union.
Proposition 3. In the coordinated rule case, the optimal debt ceiling is
d̄∗,c =















1
1 + η + γ + ω
·
k
η
∈
(
0,
k
2 + η
)
when 2 < η(η + γ + ω),
k
[
(γ + ω) +
√
(γ + ω)2 + 8(1 + η)(1 + η + γ + ω)
]
4(1 + η)(1 + η + γ + ω)
∈
[
k
2 + η
,
k
1 + η
)
otherwise.
.
Proof．See Appendix A.3.
The result in Proposition 3 indicates that the optimal debt ceiling in the
coordinated case, d̄∗,c, is below k/(1 + η). Looking back at Figure 4, we can see
that when d̄∗,c < k/(1 + η) holds, there are following two groups of countries: the
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first, labeled P.1(i), includes countries that break the debt ceiling, and the second,
labeled P.1(iii,a) and P.1(iii,b), includes countries that choose public debt issues
up to the ceiling. The fiscal union takes account of the presence of such groups of
countries, and finds that setting the debt ceiling below k/(1 + η) is optimal from
the viewpoint of social welfare maximization.
The intuition behind the choice of the fiscal union is as follows. First, suppose,
conversely, that the fiscal union sets the debt ceiling beyond k/(1 + η). Looking
back again in Figure 4, we find that in such a case, no country breaks the rule or
issues public debt up to the ceiling. Under this situation, a marginal change in
the debt ceiling has no effect on each country’s behavior and thus, does not affect
social welfare.
Next, suppose that the fiscal union sets the debt ceiling at d̄∗,c = k/(1+η), and
consider a marginal further reduction in the debt ceiling from k/(1 + η). Then,
some of the countries included in the group labeled P.1(iv) in Figure 4 moves on
to the group labeled P.1(i) or P.1(iiia). A move of countries to group P.1(iii,a)
contributes to social welfare improvement because the debt ceiling lowers the
distortionary costs of revenue collection by public debt issues. At the same time,
the move of the countries to group P.1(i) leads to social welfare losses because
the debt issuance beyond the ceiling creates additional costs and inefficiencies.
Around d̄∗,c = k/(1 + η), there are two opposing effects on social welfare, and the
former benefit always outweighs the latter cost in the present framework. Thus, a
further marginal reduction of the debt ceiling from d̄∗,c = k/(1+η) leads to social
welfare improvement. This in turn incentivizes the fiscal union to set the ceiling
below d̄∗,c = k/(1 + η). Therefore, there are always countries that issue public
debt up to or beyond the debt ceiling.
4.3 Coordination and Present Bias
In this subsection, we compare the uncoordinated and coordinated cases in terms
of debt levels and social welfare, focusing on the role of present bias in the forma-
tion of the debt rule. We assume that the cost of debt issues and rule-breaking
are high such that the following condition holds.
Assumption 2. 2 < η(η + γ + ω).
Assumption 2 allows us to focus on the first case presented in Proposition 3.
The result presented below does not change substantially if the second case in
Proposition 3 is considered (see Appendix B.)
20
We first compare the uncoordinated and coordinated cases in terms of debt
levels. The debt level in the uncoordinated case is provided in Proposition 2.
The debt level in the coordinated case is derived as follows. Recall that under
Assumption 2, the debt ceiling in the coordinated case is
d̄∗,c =
1
1 + η + γ + ω
·
k
η
∈
(
0,
k
2 + η
)
. (25)
Given this debt ceiling, there are five groups of countries, labeled P.1(i), P.1(ii),
P.1(iii,b), P.1(v), and P.1(vi), as observed in Figure 4. The associated level of debt
for each group, denoted by d∗,c, is
d∗,c(β)





































= (1+η)(η+γ+ω)
(1+β)(1+η+γ+ω)2
· k
η
when 0 ≤ β ≤ 1
1+η+γ+ω
,
∈
(
1
1+η+γ+ω
· k
η
, (1+η)(η+γ+ω)
(2+η+γ+ω)(1+η+γ+ω)
· k
η
)
when β = 1
1+η+γ+ω
,
= 1
1+η+γ+ω
· k
η
when 1
1+η+γ+ω
≤ β ≤ 1
1+η
,
∈
(
0, 1
1+η+γ+ω
· k
η
)
when β = 1
1+η
,
= 0 when β ≥ 1
1+η
.
(26)
We write d∗,c as a function of β to emphasize the role of the present bias in the
process of public debt accumulation.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The debt level is (i)
lower (higher) in the coordinated rule case than in the uncoordinated rule case if
0 ≤ β < 1/(1 + η + γ) (1/(1 + η + γ) ≤ β < 1/(1 + η)) ; and (ii) equal between
the two cases if 1/(1 + η) < β ≤ 1 :
d∗,c(β)





< d∗,uc(β) if 0 ≤ β < 1
1+η+γ
,
> d∗,uc(β) if 1
1+η+γ
< β < 1
1+η
,
= d∗,uc(β) = 0 if 1
1+η
< β ≤ 1.
Proof．See Appendix A.4．
Figure 7 illustrates the result of Proposition 4, taking β on the horizontal axis.
Consider the group of countries with high values of β to the extent such that
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β ∈ (1/(1 + η), 1] holds. These countries can attain the first-best allocation is
distinguished by no public debt issue regardless of whether the rule is coordinated
or uncoordinated. This is because a high value of β implies that period-2 selves
are weakly biased toward current consumption. This, in turn, implies that they
have no incentive to spend today more than they planned before by issuing public
debt. Thus, the public debt issue is zero for any given level of the debt ceiling
when β is high such that β ∈ (1/(1 + η), 1] holds.
[Figure 7 here.]
Next, consider the group of countries with β ∈ [0, 1/(1 + η)]. This group is
divided into the two sub-groups and includes (i) countries with low values of β to
the extent such that β ∈ [0, 1/(1 + η + γ)] holds; and (ii) countries with moderate
values of β such that β ∈ [1/(1 + η + γ), 1/(1 + η)) holds. As for the former group
of countries, the public debt issuance is limited in the coordinated case relative
to the uncoordinated case. However, the opposite result holds for the latter.
To understand the mechanism of this variation, we consider the former group
of countries. Period-2 selves in these countries are heavily biased toward the
current (i.e., period-2) consumption. The period-2 selves would support the issue
of public debt beyond the debt ceiling if this is set low. In the uncoordinated case,
the period-1 selves consider this rule-breaking possibility and set the debt ceiling
through voting at a maximum level such that the period-2 selves never break it.
In the coordinated case, the period-2 selves are more restrained in supporting
the public debt issue than in the uncoordinated case. This is because there are
additional costs for rule-breaking. presented by ω in the coordinated case. This
means that the period-2 selves may follow a coordinated debt rule even if it is
stricter than that in the uncoordinated case. Therefore, the countries concerned
here can restrain the amount of public debt to be issued by participating in the
international coordination of the debt ceiling.
Consider the latter group of countries, such that β ∈ [1/(1 + η + γ), 1/(1 + η)]
holds. These countries attain the first-best allocation characterized by no public
debt issue in the uncoordinated case. Period-2 selves have an incentive to issue
public debt to finance their consumption today (i.e., in period 2). However, the
period-1 selves fully suppress this incentive by setting the debt ceiling to zero.
Such full control is not realized in the coordinated case because some amount
of debt is allowed to be issued in this case. Thus, the period-1 selves in these
countries are made worse off by participating in the international coordination of
the debt ceiling.
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Next, compare the coordinated and uncoordinated rule cases in terms of social
welfare. The social welfare in the uncoordinated rule case is provided in Propo-
sition 2. The following lemma provides the social welfare in the coordinated rule
case.
Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The social welfare in the
coordinated rule case, denoted by V ∗,c(β), is
V ∗,c(β)

















= V(i)
(
d̄∗,c, β
)
if 0 ≤ β < 1
1+η+γ+ω
,
∈
[
V(i)
(
d̄∗,c, β = 1
1+η+γ+ω
)
, V(iii,b)
(
d̄∗,c
)
]
if β = 1
1+η+γ+ω
,
= V(iii,b)
(
d̄∗,c
)
if 1
1+η+γ+ω
< β < 1
1+η
,
∈
[
V(iii,b)
(
d̄∗,c
)
, V(vi)
}
if β = 1
1+η
,
= V(vi) if
1
1+η
< β ≤ 1,
where V ω>0(i)
(
d̄∗,c, β
)
, V ω>0(iii,b)
(
d̄∗,c, β
)
, and V ω>0(vi)
(
d̄∗,c, β
)
are defined by
V(i)
(
d̄∗,c, β
)
= 2 ln
[
(1 + η)(η + γ + ω)
1 + η + γ + ω
·
k
η
]
+ ln
[
β
(1 + β)2(1 + η + γ + ω)
]
,
V(iii,b)
(
d̄∗,c
)
= 2 ln
[
η(η + γ + ω)
2(1 + η + γ + ω)
·
k
η
]
,
V(vi) = 2 ln
(
k
2
)
.
Proof．See Appendix A.5.
Figure 8 takes β on the horizontal axis and illustrates the social welfare in
the coordinated rule case. The following three points are noted from Fig. 8.
First, consider countries populated by agents with weak present bias such that
β > 1/(1 + η) holds. Given a weak present bias of the period-2 selves, period-
1 selves can curb period-2 selves’ excessive consumption and the associated debt
issue only through saving decisions on one- and two-period securities, s12, and s13.
The debt ceiling is irrelevant for controlling period-2 selves’ behavior. Therefore,
the period-1 selves can attain the first-best allocation, and the associated social
welfare is provided at the highest level.
[Figure 8 here.]
Second, consider countries populated by agents with moderate present bias
such that 1/(1 + η) < β < 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) holds. Period-1 selves cannot fully
control period-2 selves’ excessive consumption and the corresponding debt issue
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only through savings. In other words, the period-2 selves consume more than
is optimal from the period-1 selves’ perspective. However, the period-2 selves’
incentive for excessive consumption can be controlled in part by the coordinated
debt ceiling. Therefore, the debt levels are bounded at d̄∗,c for the countries
concerned here, and these countries attain the same level of social welfare.
Finally, consider countries populated by agents with strong bias such that
β < 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) holds. In these countries, the first-best allocation is not
realized as in the former case. In addition, the period-2 selves choose to issue
public debt beyond the coordinated debt ceiling level. This incentive of overissue
of debt becomes strengthened by the present bias, and in turn, increases rule-
breaking costs. Therefore, social welfare decreases as β decreases.
Based on the results established in Proposition 2 and Lemma 1, we compare
the coordinated and uncoordinated rule cases in terms of social welfare.
Proposition 5. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The following relation
holds between social welfare in the coordinated rule case, W ∗,c(β), and that in the
uncoordinated rule case, W ∗,uc(β).
(i) When β > 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) holds,
W ∗,c(β)





> W ∗,uc(β) if 1
1+η+γ+ω
< β < 1
1+η+γ
,
< W ∗,uc(β) if 1
1+η+γ
< β < 1
1+η
,
= W ∗,uc(β) if 1
1+η
< β ≤ 1.
(ii) When β < 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) holds,
W ∗,c(β)











≤ W ∗,uc(β) if (i) φL ≥ 0, or
(ii) φH > 0 > φL and (a)
1
1+η+γ+ω
≤ −φH
φL
, or (b) β ≤ −φH
φL
< 1
1+η+γ+ω
,
> W ∗,uc(β) if (iii) φH ≤ 0, or
(iv) φH > 0 > φL and −
φH
φL
< β < 1
1+η+γ+ω
,
where φL and φH are defined by
φL ≡ (1 + η + γ + ω)η
√
(1 + η + γ)(1 + η + γ + ω)− (1 + η)(1 + η + γ)(η + γ + ω),
φH ≡ (1 + η + γ + ω)η
√
(1 + η + γ)(1 + η + γ + ω)− (1 + η)2(η + γ + ω) > φL.
Proof．See Appendix A.6．
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Figure 9 takes β on the horizontal axis, and plots W ∗,c(β) and W ∗,uc(β) to
show how they change as β varies from 0 to 1. As shown in Proposition 5, some
countries benefit from the coordination, while others lose. The costs and benefits
of participating in coordination depend on the three effects, namely unifying,
penalty, and distortionary effects. Next, we define these effects and describe how
these effects work in our framework.
[Figure 9.]
The unifying effect is the effect that occurs when the same debt rule, which
would not be optimal for each member of the fiscal union, is applied to all coun-
tries. Countries with large (small) values of β would suffer from welfare losses
associated with less (more) strict debt rule in the coordinated rule case relative
to the uncoordinated rule case. The penalty effect stems from the presence of
rule breaking costs in the coordinated rule case, denoted by ω(> 0). The costs
may produce welfare improvement associated with a disincentive for each country
to break the debt ceiling. However, some countries with small values of β might
break the coordinated debt rule even in the presence of such rule-breaking costs
because people in these countries are sufficiently impatient. This results in the
welfare losses arising from the rule-breaking: this is called the distortionary effect.
The three effects may or may not occur, or occur to varying degrees, depending
on the present bias, β. First, suppose that β is high to the extent such that
β > 1/(1+η) holds. Period-2 selves living in such a high-β country are sufficiently
patient, so period-1 selves can control period-2 selves’ decisions only through
period-1 saving. They can attain the first-best allocation with no debt issue
irrespective of the rule chosen.
Second, suppose that β is slightly lower relative to the one considered in the
first case such that 1/(1 + η + γ) < β < 1/(1 + η) holds. Period-2 selves are
less patient relative to the first case. In the uncoordinated rule case, period-1
selves set the debt ceiling at zero because they cannot fully curb period-2 selves’
behavior through saving decisions. In the coordinated rule case, all countries share
the same debt ceiling that allows for a positive debt issue. This produces welfare
losses associated with the unifying effect that gives an incentive for the period-2
selves to issue public debt up to the limit. Thus, social welfare is lower in the
coordinated rule case than in the uncoordinated rule case. It should be noted that
penalty and distortionary effects do not work in the current case as β is not as
small as the effects appear.
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Third, suppose that β is lower than for the previous two cases such that
1/(1 + η + γ + ω) < β < 1/(1 + η + γ) holds. As described in Proposition 2
below, in the uncoordinated rule case, setting the debt ceiling at the first-best
level, d̄∗ = 0, induces the period-2 selves to break the debt ceiling. To control
the rule-breaking incentive, period-1 selves set the debt ceiling at a minimum
level such that period-2 selves would never break it. In the coordinated rule case,
there is no incentive for rule-breaking because of the presence of the penalty effect.
Period-2 selves follow the coordinated debt rule and issue public debt up to the
limit. Ultimately, period-2 selves follow the debt rule and issue public debt up
to the limit in both cases. However, social welfare is higher in the coordinated
rule case than in the uncoordinated rule case because the debt ceiling is set at a
lower level in the coordinated rule case than in the uncoordinated rule case. The
discrepancy in the debt ceilings between the two cases comes from the unifying
effect observed in the coordinated rule case.
Finally, suppose that β is sufficiently low such that β < 1/(1+η+γ+ω) holds.
The period-2 selves living in such a low-β country are sufficiently impatient, and
thus have a strong incentive to cover the consumption needs in period 2 by issuing
public debt. Given such an incentive, the debt ceiling is set at a lower level in the
coordinated rule case than in the uncoordinated rule case: this is the unifying effect
that works to lower social welfare. At the same time, coordination lowers social
welfare because period-2 selves choose to issue public debt beyond the debt ceiling,
which creates the distortionary effect. However, the penalty effect, providing a
disincentive for each country to break the dent ceiling, curbs the overissuance of
public debt and leads to social welfare improvements. Which effect dominates
depends on the relative magnitude between the three effects. Figure 9 illustrates
three cases which may be observed in (a) and (b) with β ≤ −φh/φL, the sum
of the unifying and distortionary effects dominates the penalty effect, resulting
in social welfare losses; and in (b) with β > −φh/φL and (c), the penalty effect
dominates the sum of the unifying and distortionary effects, resulting in social
welfare improvement.
The last case of β < 1/(1+η+γ+ω) is presented in Proposition 5(ii); the case
implies that the welfare consequence of the coordination depends on the structural
parameters including β, η, γ, and ω, but their effects are not clearly identified
from the conditions presented in 5(ii). To resolve this problem and evaluate the
effects of the parameters more accurately, we use numerical simulations. Figure
10 depicts a set of (γ, ω) that satisfies the conditions in Proposition 5(ii) for three
cases: (a) η = 0.5, (b) η = 1.0, and (c) η = 1.5.
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[Figure 10 is here].
The following observations are made from Figure 10. First, when ω is suf-
ficiently high, either of the following conditions holds: φL ≥ 0, or −φH/φL ≥
1/(1+η+γ+ω). The distortionary effect is strengthened, and thus social welfare
is reduced as the rule-breaking costs under coordination, ω, increases. Thus, the
coordination of the debt rules results in social welfare losses when ω is sufficiently
high.
Second, when ω is low, the social welfare consequence of coordination depends
on γ, representing the rule-breaking costs relevant for both cases. The distor-
tionary effect becomes stronger as the rule breaking costs, γ, increases. Thus,
social welfare is reduced by coordination when γ is high. However, when γ is low,
the unifying and distortionary effects are outweighed by the penalty effect, and
social welfare is improved by coordination when γ is low.
Finally, suppose that ω is low but γ is moderate such that 0 < −φH/φL <
1/(1+ η+ γ +ω) holds. In this case, the relative magnitude between the penalty,
unifying, and distortionary effects depends on the present bias, β. The distor-
tionary effect is strengthened as the present bias increases (that is, as β decreases).
The unifying and distortionary effects outweighs the penalty effect and thus co-
ordination lowers social welfare if β is low; the opposite result holds if β is high.
4.4 Policy Implications
Propositions 2 to 5 provide the following policy implications: First, propositions
2 to 4 lead to the consequence that the introduction of the coordinated rule has
the effect of reducing the volume of bond issuance in countries with strongly
present-biased preferences and excessive debt (see Figure 7). In other words,
the coordinated rule is more effective than the uncoordinated rule in achieving
the objective of curbing the excessive issuance of public debt and restoring fiscal
health. However, if participation in the coordinated rule is optional for each
country, then, as Proposition 5 suggests, whether countries are willing to adopt
the coordinated rule depends on the relative size of the three effects mentioned
above (see Figure 9).
In considering the three effects, we focus on the case where the unifying and
distortionary effects dominate the penalty effect. In this case, countries facing
strongly present-biased preferences and excessive bond issuance suffer from wel-
fare losses as a result of participating in the coordinated rule (see Figure 9 (a)
and (b)). This result suggests that such countries will refuse to participate in
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the coordinated rule. The results also suggest that countries that are already
participating in the coordinated rule are willing to withdraw from it. This, in
turn, implies that the possibility of deviating from the coordinated rule makes it
difficult to introduce and maintain the coordinated rule that contributes to the
fiscal health of regional economies such as the EU. Therefore, to get countries
to commit to the coordinated rule, it will be necessary to implement measures
such as the acceptance of standards violations in times of economic downturn or
broader cooperation among countries on fiscal issues.
5 Conclusion
Households with present-biased preferences have the incentive to consume more
in the present compared to their previous consumption plans, which they previ-
ously considered optimal. When such households choose a fiscal policy through
voting, they choose a policy of increasing bond issuance. To control the excessive
issuance of government bonds through household voting behavior, it is necessary
to introduce rules to cap the issuance of government bonds. The model of Bisin,
Lizzeri, and Yariv (2015), which focuses on the role of such debt rules, is extended
in this study to an economy consisting of a large number of countries with vary-
ing degrees of present bias and the possibility of debt rule violation. Within this
extended framework, this study evaluated the effectiveness of coordinated debt
rules, such as those introduced in the EU, by conducting a comparative analysis
of the case where each country sets its own rules versus a common set of fiscal
rules for all countries within an economic area.
We show that whether a tighter debt ceiling is achieved under a coordinated
or uncoordinated rule depends on the degree of present bias in each country. In
the case of coordinated rules, the rules are based on the average present bias of
all countries, but in the case of uncoordinated rules, each rule is based on the
degree of present bias of each country. Thus, our analysis implies that the ceiling
on government bond issuance under the coordinated rule is tighter for countries
with strong present-biased preferences and looser for countries with weak present-
biased preferences.
The transition from uncoordinated rules to coordinated rules has an impact on
government bond issuance and welfare in each country. For countries with strong
present-biased preferences, participation in the coordinated rule would lead to a
tighter ceiling, which would reduce the volume of government bond issuance. By
contrast, for countries with weak present-biased preferences, participation in the
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coordinated rule loosens the ceiling and thus increasing government bond issuance.
Our analysis indicates that a uniform imposition of coordinated fiscal rules on all
countries is not necessarily desirable, since the impacts of rule changes on the
volume of government debt issuance and social welfare of each country depend on
its degree of present bias and thus vary from country to country. Therefore, our
results suggest that the degree of present bias in each country should be considered
when implementing internationally coordinated debt rules.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and the Equilibrium Allocation
In the following, we show seven propositions, labeled Ai (i=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
They correspond, in order, to results (i), (ii), (iiia), and (iiib), (iv), (v), and (vi)
in Proposition 1.
A.1.1 Equilibrium with d > d̄
Suppose that period-1 and period-2 selves expect that de = dc
(
> d̄
)
holds. Eq.
(8) leads to the savings in period-2 selves, when de = dc
(
> d̄
)
as follows:
s∗23(s12, d
c) =
{
0 when s12 ≤ S
c (dc) ,
sc23 (s12, d
c) when s12 > S
c (dc) .
Figure A.1 illustrates V1 (s12, d
c). When s12 ≤ S
c (dc) holds, the first-order
condition, with respect to s12 in (11), is rewritten as follows:
∂V1 (s12, d
c)
∂s12
= (s12 + d
c)−1 −
[
k − s12 − (1 + η + γ + ω) d
c + (γ + ω)d̄
]−1
≤ 0,
where an interior solution is given by
s12 =
k + (γ + ω)d̄− (2 + η + γ + ω) dc
2
.
[Figure A.1 here.]
Alternatively, when s12 > S
c (dc) holds, the first-order condition with respect
to s12 in (11), becomes
∂V1 (s12, d
c)
∂s12
= 0,
suggesting that V1 is independent of s12 as long as s12 > S
c (dc) holds. Notice
that V1 (s12, d
c) is continuous at s12 = S
c (dc), as illustrated in Figure A.1.
The interior solution of s12 and the threshold value S
c (dc) are compared as
follows:
Sc (dc) ⋛
k + (γ + ω)d̄− (2 + η + γ + ω) dc
2
⇔ dc ⋚
k + (γ + ω)d̄
η + γ + ω
.
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In addition, the following conditions hold:
k + (γ + ω)d̄− (2 + η + γ + ω) dc
2
⋛ 0 ⇔ dc ⋚
k + (γ + ω)d̄
2 + η + γ + ω
,
Sc (dc) ⋛ 0 ⇔ dc ⋚
k + (γ + ω)d̄
1 + η + γ + ω + β
.
Furthermore, the three threshold values of dc are ranked as
k + (γ + ω)d̄
2 + η + γ + ω
<
k + (γ + ω)d̄
1 + η + γ + ω + β
<
k + (γ + ω)d̄
η + γ + ω
.
Given these properties, we can conclude that the optimal levels of s12 and s23
when de = dc(> d̄), are given as follows:
(i) s∗12 ∈ [0, k] , s
∗
23 = s12 −
k+(γ+ω)d̄−(1+η+γ+ω+β)dc
1+β
when k+(γ+ω)d̄
1+η+γ+ω+β
≤ dc,
(ii) s∗12 = 0, s
∗
23 = 0 when
k+(γ+ω)d̄
2+η+γ+ω
≤ dc < k+(γ+ω)d̄
1+η+γ+ω+β
,
(iii) s∗12 =
k+(γ+ω)d̄−(2+η+γ+ω)dc
2
, s∗23 = 0 when d
c < k+(γ+ω)d̄
2+η+γ+ω
.
(A.1)
Next, we determine the conditions, such that the expectation of de = dc(> d̄)
is rational, for the three cases in (A.1).
Case of
(
k + (γ + ω)d̄
)
/ (1 + η + γ + ω + β) ≤ dc
From (4) and (A.1), the expectation of de = dc is rational if the following condition
holds:
dc =
k + (γ + ω)d̄− [1 + β (1 + η + γ + ω)] · k+(γ+ω)d̄−(1+η+γ+ω+β)d
c
1+β
(1 + β) (1 + η + γ + ω)
,
and
(
k + (γ + ω)d̄
)
/ (1 + η + γ + ω + β) ≤ dc, or
k + (γ + ω)d̄
1 + η + γ + ω + β
≤ dc =
k + (γ + ω)d̄
η + γ + ω
.
The associated level of s23 is
s∗23 = s
∗
12 +
k + (γ + ω)d̄
η + γ + ω
,
and the corresponding consumption levels are c2 = c3 = 0, which contradicts
the first-order conditions with respect to c2 and c3. Thus, there is no rational
expectations equilibrium in this case.
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Case of
(
k + (γ + ω)d̄
)
/ (2 + η + γ + ω) ≤ dc <
(
k + (γ + ω)d̄
)
/ (1 + η + γ + ω + β)
From (4) and (A.1), the expectation of de = dc is rational if the following condi-
tions hold:
dc =
k + (γ + ω)d̄
(1 + β) (1 + η + γ + ω)
and
k + (γ + ω)d̄
2 + η + γ + ω
≤ dc <
k + (γ + ω)d̄
1 + η + γ + ω + β
.
(A.2)
This level of public debt is above the limit, d̄, if
d̄ <
k + (γ + ω)d̄
(1 + β) (1 + η + γ + ω)
⇔ d̄ <
k
1 + η + β (1 + η + γ + ω)
= d̄L(β).
In addition, dc must satisfy the second condition in (A.2):
k + (γ + ω)d̄
2 + η + γ + ω
≤ dc =
k + (γ + ω)d̄
(1 + β) (1 + η + γ + ω)
<
k + (γ + ω)d̄
1 + η + γ + ω + β
.
The first inequality holds if and only if β ≤ 1/ (1 + η + γ + ω), whereas the second
inequality always holds.
Proposition A.1. Suppose that β ≤ 1
1+η+γ+ω
and d̄ < d̄L(β) hold. There is a
rational expectations equilibrium with d = k+(γ+ω)d̄
(1+β)(1+η+γ+ω)
∈
(
d̄, k
η
)
, and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k + (γ + ω)d̄
(1 + β) (1 + η + γ + ω)
,
β
(
k + (γ + ω)d̄
)
1 + β
, 0, k, 0
)
.
Case of dc <
(
k + (γ + ω)d̄
)
/ (2 + η + γ + ω)
From (4) and (A.1), the expectation of de = dc is rational if the following condi-
tions hold:
[1− β (1 + η + γ + ω)] ·
[(
k + (γ + ω)d̄
)
− (η.+ γ + ω) dc
]
= 0,
and dc <
k + (γ + ω)d̄
2 + η + γ + ω
. (A.3)
The first condition in (A.3) indicates that the rational expectation of public debt
is given by:
dc
{
∈
(
d̄, k
η
)
if β = 1
1+η+γ+ω
,
= k+(γ+ω)d̄
η+γ+ω
if β ̸= 1
1+η+γ+ω
.
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When β ̸= 1/ (1 + η + γ + ω), dc =
(
k + (γ + ω)d̄
)
/ (η + γ + ω) must satisfy
the second condition in (A.3):
dc =
k + (γ + ω)d̄
η + γ + ω
<
k + (γ + ω)d̄
2 + η + γ + ω
,
however, this inequality condition fails to hold. Alternatively, when β = 1/ (1 + η + γ + ω),
dc ∈
(
d̄, k/η
)
with the second condition in (A.3) gives the equilibrium level for
rational expectation of public debt as
d ∈
(
d̄,
k + (γ + ω)d̄
2 + η + γ + ω
)
,
where the set is nonempty if d̄ < k/(2 + η).
Proposition A.2. Suppose that β = 1
1+η+γ+ω
and d̄ < k
2+η
hold. There is a
rational expectations equilibrium with d ∈
(
d̄, k+(γ+ω)d̄
2+η+γ+ω
,
)
and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k + (γ + ω)d̄− (η + γ + ω) d
2
,
k + (γ + ω)d̄− (η + γ + ω)d
2
,
k + (γ + ω)d̄− (2 + η + γ + ω)d
2
,
k − (γ + ω)d̄+ (2 + η + γ + ω)d
2
, 0
)
.
■
A.1.2 Equilibrium with d = d̄
Suppose that period-1 and period-2 selves expect that de = d̄ holds. Equation (8)
leads to the period-2 selves’ saving when de = d̄ as follows:
s∗23(s12, d̄) =
{
0 when s12 ≤ S
u
(
d̄
)
,
s12 −
k−(1+η+β)·d̄
1+β
when s12 > S
u
(
d̄
)
.
Panel (a) of Figure A.2 illustrates V1
(
s12, d̄
)
. Using the same procedure as in
Section A.1.1, we can conclude that the optimal levels of s12 and s23, when d
e = d̄,
become:
(i) s∗12 ∈ [0, k] , s
∗
23 = s12 −
k−(1+η+β)d̄
1+β
when k
1+η+β
≤ d̄,
(ii) s∗12 = 0, s
∗
23 = 0 when
k
2+η
≤ d̄ < k
1+η+β
,
(iii) s∗12 =
k−(2+η)d̄
2
, s∗23 = 0 when d̄ <
k
2+η
.
(A.4)
[Figure A.2 here.]
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Next, we determine the conditions, such that the expectation of de = d̄ is
rational, for the three cases in (A.4).
Case of k/(1 + η + β) ≤ d̄
From (5) and (A.4), the expectation of de = d̄ is rational if the following condition
holds:
A
(
s∗12 ∈ [0, k] , s
∗
23 = s
∗
12 −
k − (1 + η + β) d̄
1 + β
)
≤ d̄,
≤du
(
s∗12 ∈ [0, k] , s
∗
23 = s
∗
12 −
k − (1 + η + β) d̄
1 + β
)
and
k
1 + η + β
≤ d̄.
The inequality d̄ ≤ du (·, ·) is rewritten as
d̄ ≤
k − [1 + β (1 + η)] k−(1+η+β)d̄
1+β
(1 + β)(1 + η)
⇔ η ≤ 0,
which fails to hold for any η > 0. Thus, there is no rational expectations equilib-
rium with d = d̄ when k/(1 + η + β) ≤ d̄.
Case of k/(2 + η) ≤ d̄ < k/(1 + η + β)
From (5) and (A.4), the expectation of de = d̄ is rational if the following condition
holds:
A (s∗12 = 0, s
∗
23 = 0) ≤ d̄ ≤ d
u (s∗12 = 0, s
∗
23 = 0) and
k
2 + η
≤ d̄ <
k
1 + η + β
,
that is, if
d̄L(β) =
k
1 + η + β (1 + η + γ + ω)
≤ d̄ ≤
k
1 + η + β(1 + η)
= d̄H(β) and
k
2 + η
≤ d̄ <
k
1 + η + β
.
These are summarized as in the following propositions:
Proposition A.3. Suppose that max
{
k
2+η
, d̄L(β)
}
≤ d̄ ≤ d̄H(β) holds. There is
a rational expectations equilibrium with d = d̄ and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
d̄, k − (1 + η) d̄, 0, k, 0
)
.
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Case of d̄ < k/(2 + η)
From (5) and (A.4), the expectation of de = d̄ is rational if the following conditions
hold:
A
(
s∗12 =
k − (2 + η) d̄
2
, s∗23 = 0
)
≤ d̄
≤ du
(
s∗12 =
k − (2 + η) d̄
2
, s∗23 = 0
)
and d̄ <
k
2 + η
. (A.5)
The first condition in (A.5) is reformulated as follows:
k − [1 + β (1 + η + γ + ω)] k−(2+η)d̄
2
1 + η + β (1 + η + γ + ω)
≤ d̄ ⇔
1
1 + η + γ + ω
≤ β,
and
d̄ ≤
k − [1 + β (1 + η)] k−(2+η)d̄
2
(1 + β)(1 + η)
⇔ β ≤
1
1 + η
.
The equilibrium conditions are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition A.4. Suppose that 1
1+η+γ+ω
≤ β ≤ 1
1+η
and d̄ < k
2+η
hold. There is
a rational expectations equilibrium with d = d̄ and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k − ηd̄
2
,
k − ηd̄
2
,
k − (2 + η)d̄
2
,
k + (2 + η)d̄
2
, 0
)
.
■
A.1.3 Equilibrium with d ∈
(
0, d̄
)
Suppose that period-1 and period-2 selves expect that de = du ∈
(
0, d̄
)
holds. Eq.
(8) reduces by period-2 selves when de = du ∈
(
0, d̄
)
as follows:
s∗23(s12, d
u) =
{
0 when s12 ≤ S
u(du),
su23 (s12, d
u) when s12 > S
u(du).
Panel (b) of Figure A.2 illustrates V1 (s12, d
u). Using the same procedure as
in Section A.1.1, we can conclude that the optimal levels of s12 and s23, when
de = du, become
(i) s∗12 ∈ [0, k] , s
∗
23 = s12 −
k−(1+η+β)du
1+β
when k
1+η+β
≤ du,
(ii) s∗12 = 0, s
∗
23 = 0 when
k
2+η
≤ du < k
1+η+β
,
(iii) s∗12 =
k−(2+η)du
2
, s∗23 = 0 when d
u < k
2+η
.
(A.6)
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Next, we determine the conditions such that the expectation of de = du is rational
for the three cases in (A.6).
Case of k/ (1 + η + β) ≤ du
From (3) and (A.6), the expectation of de = du is rational if the following condi-
tions hold:
du =
k − [1 + β (1 + η)] · k−(1+η+β)·d
u
1+β
(1 + β)(1 + η)
and
k
1 + η + β
≤ du. (A.7)
Solving the first condition in (A.7) for du leads to du = k/η. Following the same
reasoning as in the previous case, this candidate is not suitable for the solution.
Thus, there is no rational expectations equilibrium with k/ (1 + η + β) ≤ d.
Case of k/(2 + η) ≤ du < k/ (1 + η + β)
From (3) and (A.6), the expectation of de = du is rational if the following condi-
tions hold:
du =
k
1 + η + β(1 + η)
= d̄H(β) and
k
2 + η
≤ du <
k
1 + η + β
,
that is,
k
2 + η
≤ d̄H(β) <
k
1 + η + β
.
The first inequality holds if and only if β (1 + η) ≤ 1; the second inequality
always holds. In addition, du must satisfy du < d̄, that is,
du =
k
1 + η + β(1 + η)
= d̄H(β) < d̄.
Proposition A.5. Suppose that β ≤ 1
1+η
and d̄H(β) < d̄ hold. There is a rational
expectations equilibrium with d = d̄H(β) and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k
1 + η + β(1 + η)
,
βk
1 + β
, 0, k, 0
)
.
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Case of du < k/(2 + η)
From (3) and (A.6), the expectation of de = du is rational if the following condi-
tions hold:
[1− β (1 + η)] · ηdu = [1− β (1 + η)] · k and du <
k
2 + η
. (A.8)
The first condition in (A.8) implies that the rational expectations level of du is
given by
du
{
∈
(
0, d̄
)
when β (1 + η) = 1,
= k/η when β (1 + η) ̸= 1.
When β (1 + η) ̸= 1, the candidate for the solution is du = k/η. This candidate
is not suitable for the solution because a focus on the case of d < d̄ and d̄ < k/η
is assumed in Assumption 1. When β (1 + η) = 1, any level of du ∈
(
0, d̄
)
with
du < k/(2 + η) is rational. Thus, the equilibrium level of public debt becomes
d ∈
(
0,min
{
k
2 + η
, d̄
})
.
where the set is nonempty if d̄ > 0.
Proposition A.6. Suppose that β (1 + η) = 1 and d̄ > 0 hold. There is a rational
expectations equilibrium with d ∈
(
0,min
{
k
2+η
, d̄
})
and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k − ηd
2
,
k − ηd
2
,
k − (2 + η)d
2
,
k + (2 + η)d
2
, 0
)
.
■
A.1.4 Equilibrium with d = 0
Suppose that period-1 and period-2 selves expect that de = 0 holds. Eq. (8) leads
to saving by period-2 selves when de = 0 as follows:
s∗23(s12, 0) =
{
0 when s12 ≤ S
u(0),
su23 (s12, 0) ≡ s12 −
k
1+β
when s12 > S
u(0).
Panel (c) of Figure A.2 illustrates V1 (s12, 0). When s12 ≤ S
u(0) holds, the
first-order condition, with respect to s12 in (11), is rewritten as follows:
∂V1 (s12, 0)
∂s12
= (s12)
−1 − (k − s12)
−1 ≤ 0. (A.9)
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An interior solution, given by s12 = k/2, is feasible because it holds that s12 =
k/2 < Su(0) ≡ k/ (1 + β). Thus, an optimal level of s12 is s12 = k/2 when
s12 ≤ S
u(0), as illustrated in panel (a) of Figure A.2.
Alternatively, when s12 > S
u(0) holds, the first-order condition, with respect
to s12 in (11), becomes
∂V1 (s12, 0)
∂s12
= 0,
suggesting that V1 is independent of s12 as long as s12 > S
u(0) (see panel (a) of
Figure A.2). Note that V1 is continuous at s12 = S
u(0).
Given the expectation of de = 0, the optimal level of s12 becomes
s∗12(0) =
k
2
,
and the corresponding level of s23 is s
∗
23(k/2, 0) = 0. From (5), the expectation of
de = 0 is rational if the following condition holds:
du(s∗12, s
∗
23) = d
u
(
k
2
, 0
)
≤ 0 ⇔ β ≥
1
1 + η
.
Proposition A.7. Suppose that β ≥ 1
1+η
holds. There is a rational expectations
equilibrium with d = 0 and
(c2, c3, s12, s13, s23) =
(
k
2
,
k
2
,
k
2
,
k
2
, 0
)
.
■
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Case of β < 1/(1 + η + γ)
When β < 1/(1 + η + γ), the equilibrium allocation of consumption for a given d̄
is
(c2, c3) =









(
k+γd̄
(1+β)(1+η+γ)
,
β(k+γd̄)
1+β
)
when 0 ≤ d̄ < d̄L(β),
(
d̄, k − (1 + η)d̄
)
when d̄L(β) ≤ d̄ < d̄H(β),
(
k
(1+β)(1+η)
, βk
1+β
)
when d̄H(β) ≤ d̄,
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where the allocations come from Propositions A.1, A.3, and A.5, respectively.
Thus, the period-1 selves’ indirect utility function, V1(d̄), becomes:
V1(d̄) =





V ω=0(i) (d̄) when 0 ≤ d̄ < d̄L(β),
V ω=0(iii,a)(d̄) when d̄L(β) ≤ d̄ < d̄H(β),
V ω=0(iv) when d̄L(β) ≤ d̄.
where V ω=0(i)
(
d̄
)
, V ω=0(iii,a)
(
d̄
)
, and V ω=0(iv)
(
d̄
)
, are defined by
V ω=0(i) (d̄) = 2 ln
(
k + γd̄
)
+ ln
[
β
(1 + β)2(1 + η + γ)
]
, (A.10)
V ω=0(iii,a)(d̄) = ln
(
d̄
)
+ ln
[
k − (1 + η)d̄
]
, (A.11)
V ω=0(iv) = ln
[
βk2
(1 + β)2(1 + η)
]
, (A.12)
where the subscripts (i), (iii,a), and (iv) correspond to the statements in Propo-
sition 1; the superscript ω = 0 indicates the uncoordinated debt rule case.
The function V1(d̄) is continuous for d̄ ∈ (0,∞) because the following proper-
ties hold:
lim
d̄→d̄L(β)
V ω=0(i) (d̄) = V
ω=0
(iii,a)
(
d̄L(β)
)
= ln
[
β(1 + η + γ)k2
{1 + η + β(1 + η + γ)}2
]
,
lim
d̄→d̄H(β)
V ω=0(iii,a)(d̄) = V
ω=0
(iv) = ln
[
βk2
(1 + β)2(1 + η)
]
.
In addition, the differentiation of V ω=0n (n = (i), (iii, a), (iv)) with respect to d̄
leads to
∂V ω=0(i) (d̄)
∂d̄
=
2γ
k + γd̄
> 0, (A.13)
∂V ω=0(iii,a)(d̄)
∂d̄
=
(
d̄
)−1
− (1 + η)
[
k − (1 + η)d̄
]−1
, (A.14)
∂V ω=0(iv)
∂d̄
= 0, (A.15)
where the following condition holds:
∂V ω=0(iii,a)(d̄)
∂d̄
≷ 0 ⇔ d̄ ≶
k
2(1 + η)
. (A.16)
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Given the assumption of β < 1/(1 + η + γ), we have
k
2(1 + η)
< d̄L(β),
implying that V ω=0(iii,a) is decreasing in d̄ for the range of
[
d̄L(β), d̄H(β)
)
. Thus, the
optimal d̄ becomes
d̄∗,uc = d̄L(β),
and the corresponding allocation of saving, consumption, and public debt is given
by
(s12, s13,c2, c3) =
(
0, 0,
k
1 + η + β(1 + η + γ)
,
β(1 + η + γ)k
1 + η + β(1 + η + γ)
)
.
In this case, the equilibrium debt issue and the maximized welfare under the
optimal debt ceiling are given by d∗,uc = d̄∗,uc = d̄L(β) and
W ∗,uc = V ω=0(iii,a)
(
d̄L(β)
)
= ln
[
β(1 + η + γ)k2
{1 + η + β(1 + η + γ)}2
]
.
Case of β = 1/(1 + η + γ)
From Propositions A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, and Figure 4, period-1 selves’ indirect
utility function, V1(d̄), becomes
V1(d̄) =









{
V ω=0(i) (d̄), V
ω=0
(ii) (d̄), V
ω=0
(iii,b)(d̄)
}
when 0 ≤ d̄ < k
2+η
,
V ω=0(iii,a)(d̄) when
k
2+η
≤ d̄ ≤ k
1+η+ 1+η
1+η+γ
,
V ω=0(iv) when
k
1+η+ 1+η
1+η+γ
< d̄,
where V ω=0(i) (d̄), V
ω=0
(iii,a)(d̄), and V
ω=0
(iv) (d̄) are given in equations (A.10) to (A.12),
respectively, and V ω=0(ii)
(
d̄
)
is given by
V ω=0(ii) ≡ 2 ln
[
k + γd̄− (η + γ)d
2
]
, d ∈
(
d̄,
k + γd̄
2 + η + γ
)
, (A.17)
V ω=0(iii,b) ≡ 2 ln
(
k − ηd̄
2
)
. (A.18)
The subscripts (ii) in (A.17) and (iii,b) in (A.18) correspond to the statements in
Proposition 1.
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To find the optimal d̄, we first consider the maximization of V1(d̄) within
the range of d̄ ∈ [k/(2 + η),∞). The properties in (A.14), (A.15), and (A.16)
indicate that V ω=0(iii,a)(d̄) is decreasing in d̄ for d̄ ∈ [k/(2 + η),∞), and that V
ω=0
(iv)
is independent of d̄. Thus, V1(d̄) is maximized at d̄ = k/(2 + η) for the range of
d̄ ≥ k/(2 + η). The maximized value of V1(d̄) is
max V1(d̄)
∣
∣
d̄≥k/(2+η)
= V ω=0(iii,a)
(
k
2 + η
)
= 2 ln
(
k
2 + η
)
. (A.19)
Next, consider the maximization of V1(d̄) within the range d̄ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)).
Recall that there are three equilibria, described in Proposition 1(i), (ii), and (iiib).
Thus, the optimal d̄ depends on the period-1 selves’ expectations about the real-
ization of the equilibrium.
A.2.1 Case of Equilibrium in Proposition 1 (i)
Suppose that the period-1 selves expect that the allocation described in Propo-
sition 1 (i) and Proposition A.1 is realized in equilibrium. From Eq. (A.10), the
period-1 selves’ indirect utility function is given by
V ω=0(i)
(
d̄
)
= 2 ln
(
k + γd̄
)
− 2 ln (2 + η + γ) ,
for d̄ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)). Because V ω=0(i)
(
d̄
)
is strictly increasing in d̄, we obtain the
supremum of V ω=0(i)
(
d̄
)
as follows:
sup
0≤d̄<k/(2+η)
V ω=0(i)
(
d̄
)
= lim
d̄→k/(2+η)
V(i)
(
d̄
)
= 2 ln
(
k
2 + η
)
= V ω=0(iii,a)
(
k
2 + η
)
.
This implies that for any d̄ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)), it holdsthat that V ω=0(i)
(
d̄
)
< V ω=0(iii,a) (k/(2 + η)).
Thus, the optimal d̄ is d̄∗,uc = k/(2+ η), when the period-1 selves expect that the
equilibrium described in Proposition 1 (i) is realized.
A.2.2 Case of Equilibrium in Proposition 1 (ii)
Suppose that the period-1 selves expect that the allocation described in Proposi-
tion 1 (ii) and Proposition A.2 is realized in equilibrium. As stated in Proposition
1(ii), there are continuum of equilibrium debt levels, d̄ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)). Next, we
show that V ω=0(ii)
(
d̄
)
< V ω=0(iii,a) (k/(2 + η)) holds for any d̄ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)).
Assume that period-1 and period-2 selves form the same expectations about
the debt level in period 2, and that their expectations are independent of d̄ set
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by the period-1 government. Under this assumption, V ω=0(ii)
(
d̄
)
in Eq. (A.17) is
strictly increasing in d̄. Thus, the upper limit of V ω=0(ii)
(
d̄
)
becomes
sup
0≤d̄<k/(2+η)
V ω=0(ii)
(
d̄
)
= lim
d̄→k/(2+η)
V(ii)
(
d̄
)
= 2 ln
[
k + γ
2+η
k − (η + γ) d
2
]
.
Recall that inf d → k/(2 + η) when d̄ → k/(2 + η). Given this property, we
have
sup
0≤d̄<k/(2+η)
V ω=0(ii)
(
d̄
)
< 2 ln
[
k + γ
2+η
k − (η + γ) d
2
]
= V ω=0(iii,a)
(
k
2 + η
)
.
Thus, for any d̄ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η)), we obtain V ω=0(ii)
(
d̄
)
< V ω=0(iii,a) (k/(2 + η)), imply-
ing that the optimal debt ceiling is d̄∗,uc = k/(2 + η).
A.2.3 Case of Equilibrium in Proposition 1 (iiib)
Suppose that the period-1 selves expect that the allocation described in Proposi-
tion 1 (iiib) and Proposition A.4 is realized in equilibrium. The period-1 selves’
indirect utility function is given by V ω=0(iii,b)
(
d̄
)
in Eq. (A.18) for d̄ ∈ [0, k/(2 + η, )).
Given that V ω=0(iii,b)
(
d̄
)
is decreasing in d̄, we obtain
max
0≤d̄<k/(2+η)
V ω=0(iii,b)
(
d̄
)
= V ω=0(iii,b) (0) = 2 ln
(
k
2
)
> V ω=0(iii,a)
(
k
2 + η
)
= 2 ln
(
k
2 + η
)
.
The inequality implies that the optimal d̄ is d̄∗,uc = 0.
Case of 1/(1 + η + γ) < β ≤ 1/(1 + η)
Suppose that the ceiling is set at d̄ = 0. Then, the allocation of consumption is
(c2, c3) =
(
k
2
,
k
2
)
,
where the allocation comes from Proposition A.4. This allocation of consumption
is consistent with the solution to the following period-1 selves’ utility maximization
problem:
max ln(c2) + ln(c3) s.t. c2 + c3 ≤ k.
Thus, the optimal level of d̄ becomes d̄∗,uc = 0.
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In this case, the equilibrium debt issue and maximized welfare under the opti-
mal debt ceiling are given by d∗,uc = d̄∗,uc = 0 and W ∗,uc = V ω=0(iii,b) (0) = 2 ln(k/2).
Case of β > 1/(1 + η)
When β > 1/(1 + η), the equilibrium allocation of consumption is
(c2, c3) =
(
k
2
,
k
2
)
∀ d̄ ∈
[
0,
k
η
)
, (A.20)
where the allocation comes from Proposition A.7. Since the allocation is indepen-
dent from d̄, the optimal level of d̄ becomes d̄∗,uc ∈ [0, k/η).
In this case, the equilibrium debt issue and the maximized welfare under the
optimal debt ceiling are given by d∗,uc = 0 and W ∗,uc = 2 ln(k/2).
■
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The strategy of the proof is as follows. First, we give in Lemma A.1 six properties
of the social welfare function W u(d̄) in Eq. (14). Second, we illustrate WU
(
d̄
)
,
taking d̄ in the horizontal axis. Finally, with the use of the illustration of W u(d̄),
we find out the optimal d̄ that maximizes the social welfare.
Lemma A.1. The social welfare function, W u(d̄) in Eq. (14), has the following
six properties:
(i) WUlow (·) is strictly concave with respect to d̄;
(ii) limd̄→ k
2+η
∂WU
low(d̄)
∂d̄
=
∂WU
mid(d̄)
∂d̄
∣
∣
∣
∣
d̄= k
2+η
;
(iii) W u(·) is continuous for d̄ ∈ [0, k/η) ;
(iv) W u(·) is strictly concave with respect to d̄ for d̄ < k/(1 + η);
(v) limd̄→ k
2+η
∂WU
low(d̄)
∂d̄
=
∂WU
mid(d̄)
∂d̄
∣
∣
∣
∣
d̄= k
2+η
⋛ 0 ⇔ 2 ⋛ η (η + γ + ω) ;
(vi)
∂WU
mid(d̄)
∂d̄
∣
∣
∣
∣
d̄= k
1+η
< 0.
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Proof of statement (i)
From Eqs. (15)，(18)，(20)，and (22), the first and second derivatives of WUlow(d̄)
with respect to d̄ are:
∂WUlow(d̄)
∂d̄
=
2(γ + ω)
k + (γ + ω)d̄
·
1
1 + η + γ + ω
−
2η
k − ηd̄
·
[
1
1 + η
−
1
1 + η + γ + ω
]
,
(A.21)
∂2WUlow(d̄)
∂d̄2
= −
2(γ + ω)2
[
k + (γ + ω)d̄
]2 ·
1
1 + η + γ + ω
−
2η2
(
k − ηd̄
)2 ·
[
1
1 + η
−
1
1 + η + γ + ω
]
< 0.
The second derivative shows that WUlow(d̄) is strictly concave with respect to d̄.
■
Proof of statement (ii)
From Eqs. (16)，(18)，(19)，(21)，and (22), the first derivative of WUmid(d̄) with
respect to d̄ is:
∂WUmid(d̄)
∂d̄
=
2(γ + ω)
k + (γ + ω)d̄
· β1(d̄) +
k − 2(1 + η)d̄
d̄[k − (1 + η)d̄]
·
[
β2(d̄)− β1(d̄)
]
. (A.22)
Then, from Eqs. (23), (24), (A.21) and (A.22), we obtain
lim
d̄→ k
2+η
∂WUlow(d̄)
∂d̄
=
∂WUmid
∂d̄
∣
∣
∣
d̄= k
2+η
,
showing that the slope of WUlow(d̄) at d̄ =
k
2+η
is equivalent to the slope of WUmid(d̄)
at d̄ = k
2+η
.
■
Proof of statement (iii)
First, we show that W ulow(d̄) and W
u
mid(d̄) are continuous at d̄ = k/(2 + η). To
show this, notice that the third terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (16) is zero
because β2 (k/(1 + η)) = 1/(1 + η) holds from Eq. (24). In addition, the second
term in Eq. (15) and the second term in Eq. (16) at d̄ = k/(2 + η) are reduced
to:
ln(d̄) + ln[k − (1 + η)d̄] = 2 ln
(
k − ηd̄
2
)
= 2 ln
(
k
2 + η
)
.
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Therefore, we obtain
lim
d̄→ k
2+η
WUlow(d̄) = W
U
mid
(
k
2 + η
)
,
showing that W ulow(d̄) and W
u
mid(d̄) are continuous at d̄ = k/(2 + η).
Next, we show that WUmid(d̄) and W
U
high(d̄) are continuous at d̄ = k/(1 + η).
From (16), (17), (23), and (24), we have
lim
d̄→ k
1+η
WUmid(d̄) = W
U
high
(
k
1 + η
)
,
showing that WUmid(d̄) and W
U
high(d̄) are continuous at d̄ = k/(1 + η).
■
Proof of statement (iv)
With the use of Eqs. (23), (24) and (A.22), we can write down the second deriva-
tive of WUmid(d̄) with respect to d̄ as follows:
∂2WUmid(d̄)
∂d̄2
=−
2(γ + ω)2
[
k + (γ + ω)d̄
]2 ·
k − (1 + η)d̄
(1 + η + γ + ω)d̄
−
2(γ + ω)
k + (γ + ω)d̄
·
k
(1 + η + γ + ω)(d̄2)
−
γ + ω
(1 + η)(1 + η + γ + ω)(d̄)2
·
2[k − (1 + η)d̄]2
[
k − (1 + η)d̄
]
d̄
.
This expression shows that ∂2WUmid(d̄)/∂d̄
2 < 0 holds, that is, WUmid(d̄) is strictly
concave with respect to d̄, if d̄ < k/(1 + η).
■
Proof of statement (v)
From Eq. (A.21), we have
lim
d̄→ k
2+η
∂WUlow(d̄)
∂d̄
⋛ 0 ⇔ 2 ⋛ η(η + γ + ω).
Recall that the slopes of WUlow(d̄) and W
U
mid(d̄) at d̄ = k/(2+ η) are equivalent,
as shown in Lemma A.1(ii). With the use of this property, we obtain
lim
d̄→ k
2+η
∂WUlow(d̄)
∂d̄
=
∂WUmid(d̄)
∂d̄
∣
∣
∣
d̄= k
2+η
⋛ 0 ⇔ 2 ⋛ η(η + γ + ω).
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■
Proof of statement (vi)
We substitute Eqs. (23) and (24) into Eq. (A.22) to obtain
∂WUmid(d̄)
∂d̄
=
2(γ + ω)
k + (γ + ω)d̄
·
k − (1 + η)d̄
(1 + η + γ + ω)d̄
+
k − 2(1 + η)d̄
d̄
·
γ + ω
d̄(1 + η)(1 + η + γ + ω)
. (A.23)
We evaluate the expression in Eq. (A.23) at d̄ = k/(1 + η) and obtain
∂WUmid(d̄)
∂d̄
∣
∣
∣
d̄= k
1+η
=
−(1 + η)k
(1 + η)
(
k
1+η
)2 ·
γ + ω
(1 + η)(1 + η + γ + ω)
< 0.
■
We use the results in Lemma A.1 to illustrate the graph of the social welfare
function, as depicted in Fig. A.3.
[Figure A.3 here.]
From the figure, and the results in Lemma A.1, we find the following properties:
First, the social welfare function is continuous with respect to d̄. Second, from the
results in Lemma A.1 (iii) and (iv), the social welfare function is maximized within
the range of [0, k/(1+η)). Finally, from the results in Lemma A.1 (i), (ii), and (iv),
social welfare is maximized within the range [0, k/(2+η)) or [k/(2+η), k/(1+η)),
depending on the slope of WU(d̄) at d̄ = k/(2 + η).
Let d̄∗,c denote the optimal d̄ under the coordinated rule. From the result in
Lemma A.1, d̄∗,c lies within the range (0, k/(2+η)) if 2 < η (η + γ + ω) and range
[k/(2 + η), k/(1 + η)) if 2 ≥ η (η + γ + ω).
First, consider the case of 2 < η (η + γ + ω). From Eq. (A.21), the optimal
coordinated rule, denoted by d̄∗,c, satisfies
∂WUlow
(
d̄∗,c
)
d∗,c
= 0.
Thus, d̄∗,c is given by
d̄∗,c =
1
1 + η + γ + ω
·
k
η
.
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Second, consider the case of 2 ≥ η (η + γ + ω). From Eq. (A.23), d̄∗,c satisfies
∂WUmid(d̄
∗,c)
∂d̄
= 0 ⇔ 2(1 + η)(1 + η + γ + ω)
(
d̄∗,c
)2
− (γ + ω)kd̄∗,c − k2 = 0.
Solving this for d̄∗,c leads to:
d̄∗,c =
(γ + ω)k + k
√
(γ + ω)2 + 8(1 + η)(1 + η + γ + ω)
4(1 + η)(1 + η + γ + ω)
.
■
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Case of β < 1/(1 + η + γ + ω)
First, suppose that β satisfies β < 1/(1 + η + γ + ω). In this case, the following
condition holds at β = 0:
d∗,uc(0) > d∗,c(0) ⇔ η(η + γ + ω) > 1. (A.24)
The above inequality holds, that is, d∗,uc(0) > d∗,c(0) holds, under Assumption 2.
The following condition also holds under Assumption 2.
d∗,uc
(
1
1 + η + γ
)
> d∗,c
(
1
1 + η + γ + ω
)
⇔ η(η + γ + ω) > 2.
Given that d∗,uc(β) is non-increasing in β, we have d∗,uc(1/(1 + η + γ + ω)) >
d∗,uc(1/(1 + η + γ)). Thus, we obtain
d∗,uc
(
1
1 + η + γ + ω
)
> d∗,c
(
1
1 + η + γ + ω
)
. (A.25)
We suppose that there is a β that satisfies d∗,uc(β) = d∗,c(β) within the range
of β ∈ (0, 1/(1 + η + γ + ω)) and show a contradiction. Eqs. (A.24) and (A.25)
indicate that the solution, if it exists, is multiple-valued. Solving d∗,uc(β) = d∗,c(β)
for β leads to:
d∗,uc(β) = d∗,c(β) ⇔ β =
(1 + η)2(η + γ + ω)− (1 + η + γ + ω)2η
(1 + η + γ + ω)2η − (1 + η)(η + γ + ω)(1 + η + γ)
,
showing that the solution is unique; this is a contradiction. Thus, we can conclude
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that the following holds:
d∗,uc(β) > d∗,c(β) ∀β ∈
[
0,
1
1 + η + γ + ω
)
.
Case of 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) < β < 1/(1 + η + γ)
Second, suppose that β satisfies 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) < β < 1/(1 + η + γ). In this
case, we have
d∗,uc(β) > d∗,c(β) ⇔
η(η + γ + ω)− 1
1 + η + γ
> β.
The above inequality holds under Assumption 2 and β < 1/(1+ η+ γ). Thus, we
obtain
d∗,uc(β) > d∗,c(β) ∀ β ∈
(
1
1 + η + γ + ω
,
1
1 + η + γ
)
.
Case of 1/(1 + η + γ) < β < 1/(1 + η)
Third, suppose that β satisfies 1/(1 + η + γ) < β < 1/(1 + η). d∗,c(β) is given by
d∗,c(β) = (1/(1 + η + γ + ω)) · (k/η), and d∗,uc(β) = 0. Thus, we obtain
d∗,c(β) =
1
1 + η + γ + ω
·
k
η
> 0 = d∗,uc(β) ∀ β ∈
(
1
1 + η + γ
,
1
1 + η
)
.
Case of 1/(1 + η) < β ≤ 1
Finally, suppose that β satisfies 1/(1+η) < β < 1. In this case, we have d∗,uc(β) =
d∗,c(β) = 0 ∀β ∈ (1/(1 + η), 1].
■
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
Case of β < 1/(1 + η + γ + ω)
First, suppose that β < 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) holds. For a given d∗,c(β), there is
an equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1(i). With the use of the optimal
coordinated rule in Eq. (25) and the result in Proposition A.1, we can compute
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the social welfare as follows:
W ∗,c(β) =V ω>0(i)
(
d̄∗,c, β
)
=2 ln
[
(1 + η)(η + γ + ω)
1 + η + γ + ω
·
k
η
]
+ ln
[
β
(1 + β)2(1 + η + γ + ω)
]
, (A.26)
where the subscript (i) corresponds to the statements in Proposition 1; the super-
script ω > 0 indicates the coordinated debt rule case.
Case of 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) < β < 1/(1 + η)
Second, suppose that 1/(1+η+γ+ω) < β < 1/(1+η) holds. For a given d∗,c(β),
there is an equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1(iiib). With the use of the
optimal coordinated rule in Eq. (25) and the result in Proposition A.4, we can
compute the social welfare as follows:
W ∗,c(β) = V ω>0(iii,b)
(
d̄∗,c
)
= 2 ln
[
η(η + γ + ω)
2(1 + η + γ + ω)
·
k
η
]
. (A.27)
Case of 1/(1 + η) < β ≤ 1
Third, suppose that 1/(1 + η) ≤ β < 1 holds. For a given d∗,c(β), there is an
equilibrium characterized in Proposition A.7(vi). With the use of the optimal
coordinated rule in Eq. (25) and the result in Proposition A.7, we can compute
the social welfare as follows:
W ∗,c(β) = V ω>0(vi) = 2 ln
(
k
2
)
. (A.28)
Case of β = 1/(1 + η + γ + ω)
Fourth, suppose that β = 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) holds. For a given d∗,c(β), there
are equilibria characterized in Proposition 1 (i), (ii), and (iiib). With the use of
the optimal coordinated rule in Eq. (25), the result in Proposition A.2 and Eqs.
(A.27) and (A.28), we have:
inf
d
V ω>0(ii)
(
d̄∗,c, d
)
= V ω>0(i)
(
d̄∗,c, β =
1
1 + η + γ + ω
)
= 2 ln
[
(1 + η)(η + γ + ω)
(2 + η + γ + ω)(1 + η + γ + ω)
·
k
η
]
,
sup
d
V(ii)
(
d̄∗,c, d
)
= V(iii,b)
(
d̄∗,c
)
= 2 ln
[
η(η + γ + ω)
2(1 + η + γ + ω)
·
k
η
]
.
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Therefore, the social welfare in the present case becomes:
W ∗,c(β) ∈
[
V ω>0(i)
(
d̄∗,c, β =
1
1 + η + γ + ω
)
, V ω>0(iii,b)
(
d̄∗,c
)
]
.
Case of β = 1/(1 + η)
Finally, suppose that β = 1/(1+ η) holds. For a given d∗,c(β), there are equilibria
characterized in Proposition 1(iii,a), (iv), and (vi). Note that d∗,c(β) < k/(2 + η)
holds. With the use of the optimal coordinated rule in Eq. (25), the result in
Proposition A.6 and Eqs. (25) and (A.27), we have:
inf
d
V ω>0(v)
(
d̄∗,c, d
)
= V ω>0(iii,b)
(
d̄∗,c
)
= 2 ln
[
η(η + γ + ω)
2(1 + η + γ + ω)
·
k
η
]
,
sup
d
V(v)
(
d̄∗,c, d
)
= V ω>0(vi) = 2 ln
(
k
2
)
.
Therefore, the social welfare in the present case becomes:
W ∗,c(β) ∈
[
V ω>0(iii,b)
(
d̄∗,c
)
, V ω>0(vi)
]
.
■
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Case of β > 1/(1 + η + γ + ω)
First, suppose that 1/(1 + η) < β ≤ 1 holds. Based on the results established in
Proposition 2 and Lemma 1, we compare the social welfare between the two cases
(that is, the coordinated and uncoordinated cases) and obtain
W ∗,c(β) = V ω>0(vi) = 2 ln
(
k
2
)
= W ∗,uc(β).
Second, suppose that 1/(1 + η + γ) < β < 1/(1 + η) holds. Following the
method used in the previous case, we obtain
W ∗,c(β) = V ω>0(iii,b)
(
d̄∗,c
)
= 2 ln
[
η(η + γ + ω)
2(1 + η + γ + ω)
·
k
η
]
< 2 ln
(
k
2
)
= W ∗,uc(β).
Third, suppose that 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) < β < 1/(1 + η + γ) holds. Notice
that we have W ∗,c(β) = V ω>0(iii,b) and W
∗,uc (β) = V ω=0(iii,a)
(
d̄L (β)
)
, and note that
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V ω=0(iii,a)
(
d̄L (β)
)
is increasing in β. Then we have
V ω=0(iii,a)
(
d̄L(β)
)
∣
∣
∣
β<1/(1+η+γ)
< V ω=0(iii,a)
(
d̄L
(
1
1 + η + γ
))
= 2 ln
(
k
2 + η
)
,
where we have
2 ln
(
k
2 + η
)
< V ω>0(iii,b)
(
d̄∗,c
)
⇔ 2 < η(η + γ + ω).
This condition holds under Assumption 2. Therefore, we conclude thatW ∗,c (β) >
W ∗,uc (β) holds.
Case of β < 1/(1 + η + γ + ω)
Finally, suppose that β < 1/(1 + η + γ + ω) holds. The results established in
Proposition 2 and Lemma 1 lead to W ∗,c (β) = V ω>0(i)
(
d̄∗,c
)
, and W ∗,uc (β) =
V ω=0(iii,a)
(
d̄L (β)
)
, We compare W ∗,c (β) and W ∗,uc (β) and obtain
W ∗,c(β) ⋛ W ∗,uc(β) ⇔ −φLβ ⋛ φH , (A.29)
where φL and φH(> φL) are defined by
φL ≡ (1 + η + γ + ω)η
√
(1 + η + γ)(1 + η + γ + ω)− (1 + η)(1 + η + γ)(η + γ + ω),
φH ≡ (1 + η + γ + ω)η
√
(1 + η + γ)(1 + η + γ + ω)− (1 + η)2(η + γ + ω) > φL.
Focusing on the level of φL, we divide the current case into four parts. First,
when φL > 0 holds, we can reformulate Eq. (A.29) as W
∗,c (β) ⋛ W ∗,uc (β) ⇔
β ⋚ −φH/φL. We have −φH/φL < 0 because φH > φL > 0 holds. Therefore, we
conclude that W ∗,c (β) < W ∗,uc (β) holds ∀β < 1/(1 + η + γ + ω).
Second, when φL = 0 holds, we can rewrite Eq. (A.29) asW
∗,c (β) ⋛ W ∗,uc (β) ⇔
0 ⋛ φH . Given that φH > φL = 0 holds, we immediately find that W ∗,c (β) <
W ∗,uc (β) holds ∀β < 1/(1 + η + γ + ω).
Third, when φH > 0 > φL holds, we have −φH/φL > 0. Given this condition,
we can reformulate Eq. (A.29) as W ∗,c (β) ⋛ W ∗,uc (β) ⇔ β ⋛ −φH/φL. Thus,
we obtain
W ∗,c(β)





< W ∗,uc(β) if 1
1+η+γ+ω
≤ −φH
φL
,
> W ∗,uc(β) if − φH
φL
< β < 1
1+η+γ+ω
,
≤ W ∗,uc(β) if β ≤ −φH
φL
< 1
1+η+γ+ω
.
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Finally, when 0 ≥ φH holds, we have 0 ≥ φH > φL. Given this condition,
we can write Eq. (A.29) as W ∗,c (β) ⋛ W ∗,uc (β) ⇔ β ⋛ −φH/φL. It should be
noted that −φH/φL ≤ 0 holds because 0 ≥ φH > φL. Therefore, we conclude that
W ∗,c (β) ≥ W ∗,uc (β) holds ∀β < 1/(1 + η + γ + ω).
■
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Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Period-1 agents Period-2 agents Period-2 government
Figure 1: Timing of events.
54
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2: Illustration of the period-2 government’s objective function when
du(s12, s23) ≤ 0 ≤ d̄ (panel (a)), 0 < d
u(s12, s23) < d̄ (panel (b)), A(s12, s23) ≤ d̄ ≤
du(s12, s23) (panel (c)), and d̄ < A(s12, s23) (panel (d)).
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Expectation Period-1 agents Period-2 agents Period-2 government
Rational expectation
Figure 3: Rational expecations equilibrium.
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P.1(iv)
P.1(vi)
P.1(iii,b), (v), (vi)P.1(i), (ii), (iii,b) 
P.1(iv), (v), (vi)
P.1(iii,b)
P.1(i)
P.1(iii,a)
Figure 4: Classification of the equilibrium states according to the level of public
debt for a given debt rule. The horizontal axis takes β; the vertical axis takes d̄.
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P.1(i)
P.1(ii)
P.1(iii,b) P.1(v)
P.1(vi)
P.1(i)
P.1(iv)
P.1(iii,a)
P.1(v)
P.1(vi)
P.1(iv)
P.1(v)
P.1(vi)
P.1(i)
P.1(ii)
P.1(iii,b)
P.1(vi)
P.1(v)
P.1(i) P.1(iv)P.1(iii,a)
P.1(v)
P.1(vi)
P.1(iv)
P.1(vi)
P.1(v)
Figure 5: The equilibrium debt according to β. β1 ≡
1
1+η+γ
· k−(1+η)d̄
d̄
, β2 ≡
1
1+η
· k−(1+η)d̄
d̄
.
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P.1(iii,a)
P.1(iii,b)
P.1(vi)
Figure 6: The optimal uncoordinated debt ceiling for the period-1 selves accord-
ing to β.
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P.1(iii,a)
P.1(iii,b) P.1(vi)
P.1(vi)
P.1(iii,b)
P.1(i)
P.1(ii)
P.1(v)
Figure 7: The debt levels in the uncoordinated case (plotted by the blue dotted
curve) and in the coordinated case (plotted by the red solid curve)
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Figure 8: Social welfare in the coordinated case.
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Figure 9: Social welfare in the uncoordinated case (plotted by the blue curve)
and in the coordinated case (plotted by the red solid curve).
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Figure 10: A set of (γ, ω) that satisfies the conditions in Proposition 5(ii) for
three cases: η = 0.5 (panel (a)), η = 1.0 (panel (b)), and η = 1.5 (panel (c))
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(a) (b)
Figure A.1: Illustration of the period-1 selves’ utility, V1 (s12, d
c),
when
[
k + γd̄− (2 + η + γ)dc
]
/2 ≤ Sc (dc) (panel (a)) and
[
k + γd̄− (2 + η + γ)dc
]
/2 > Sc (dc) (panel (b)).
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure A.2: Illustration of the period-1 selves’ utility when de = d̄ (panel (a)),
de = du (panel (b)), and de = 0 (panel (c))
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Figure A.3: Illustration of the social welfare function in the coordinated case:
case of 2 < η(η + γ + ω) in panel (a) and case of 2 ≥ η(η + γ + ω) in panel (b).
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